

## Book Reviews

John R. Ballard, *Fighting for Fallujah: A New Dawn for Iraq*. Published by Praeger Security International. 2006, 148 pages. Cloth \$44.95.

Reviewed by LCDR **Youssef Aboul-Enein**, USN  
Middle East Foreign Area Officer  
Washington, DC

Marine Corps Colonel John Ballard served as Commander of the 4th Civil Affairs Group during intensive operations in 2004–2005 to take back Fallujah from Sunni insurgents and dealing with the Shiite militant group led by the cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr in Najaf. Currently Ballard is serving at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and his first book is a highly readable account of Operation *Al-Fajr* (New Dawn) as it was known by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Army. Operation Vigilant Resolve is what US Forces called the mission to clear Fallujah of insurgent groups.

The book begins with the gruesome murder of four Blackwater Security Contractors driving through Fallujah. These contractors were veterans of U.S. Special Forces whose dead bodies were mutilated, burned and left to hang across Fallujah's Green Bridge. The author exposes vital peculiarities of the Iraqi town of Fallujah, which made it attractive for Sunni militants to setup a base of operations. Located 35 miles west of Baghdad with the Euphrates River to the east, Fallujah has been a hotbed of smuggling, both by river and landward being the first major town for those driving into Iraq from Jordan. It is here that the 1920 Revolt against the British Mandate was started, by Sheikh Al-Dhari, whose current descendants run the Muslim Ulama Council, a group thought to be the mouthpiece of the insurgency. Throughout Ottoman times and during the British administration of Iraq, sheikhs and imams took their cut from those wanting access to Baghdad from Jordan.

Driving through Fallujah without understanding this historical context is a grave tactical mistake. Further recent history that cause Fallujans to hate the West is discussed in the book, including an errant British bomb that targeted a bridge and instead landed in a central market killing over 100 local residents during Operation Desert Storm.

Ballard's book takes a critical assessment and offers a 'lessons learned' approach to the various American units that have deployed to Fallujah like the Army's 2nd Battalion, 3rd Armored Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. With each contact with the insurgency, U.S. forces learn (sometimes tragically) the urban tactics and nature of the insurgency. Pages highlight how Iraq's insurgents can be divided into three segments, the Former Regime Elements (FRE), Foreign Terrorist Groups (a potent mix of suicidal terrorists and leaders from the Arab world), and finally criminals and malcontents who are attempting to turn a buck by supporting insurgency operations for cash. Ballard urges that to defeat the insurgency and jihadists, Coalition troops must be engaged with the local population and the overarching focus should be on the improvement of people's lives, which would then erode the

bases of support from which insurgents operate. When demonstrating the power to the insurgency, the book advocates showing resolve, and perhaps the biggest lesson for military planners is to not only plan the urban war, but also for the reconstruction of a village infested with terrorists.

Ballard does discuss the destruction of Fallujah and the aftermath of the operation in which thousands of weapons and munitions were stored throughout the city with the largest cache being in a mosque. Coalition forces also discovered the Iraqi civilian victims of the insurgency inside torture rooms designed in basements and bunkers. The book discusses the negative reporting by *Al-Jazeera* on Operations in Fallujah. In reading Ballard's account, there were many heinous crimes the United States found in Fallujah that the insurgency left behind that could have been used to criminalize this movement in world public opinion. In addition, Ballard discusses the competence of the Iraqi Security Forces working with the U.S. forces in clearing Fallujah, something that should have gotten more press coverage.

Ballard is critical of the timing by the Coalition Provisional Authority to declare Shiite militant leader Muqtada Al-Sadr an enemy while Coalition forces were dealing with Sunni uprisings in central Iraq. One chapter is devoted to the tactics and progress of the Battle of Najaf against the Mahdi Army in and around graveyards and holy sites. Readers will learn how when one section of Iraq holds off Coalition forces, another section becomes emboldened. Events in Najaf stiffened the resolve of the insurgents in Fallujah to carry out a massive Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack involving 300 fighters against a U.S. Marine Armored Assault Vehicle (AAV) Platoon. A little under half of the book discusses Operation Vigilant Resolve and details a success story of Iraqi General Abdul-Qader working effectively with U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units to retake Fallujah. It is a blow by blow discussion of tactics that is a recommended read for those going to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and for anyone with an interest in the way conflicts will be fought in the Global War on Terrorism.

Sebastian Smith, *Allah's Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya, New Edition*. London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2005. 328 pages. ISBN: 1850439796. \$24.95 paper.

Reviewed by **Mia Bloom**  
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Atlanta, Georgia, USA

Sebastian Smith, a Moscow-based reporter for Agence France-Presse, has written a stunningly detailed account of the history of conflict in the Northern Caucasus. Part travelogue, part historical account, and littered throughout with excerpts of personal interviews, the book provides a mass of information to anyone interested in Chechnya that goes beyond being a simple accounting of Chechen conflict to provide intricate detail about the various ethnic (and tribal) divisions within Chechnya, a history of the culture and predominantly, the Chechen conflict with Russia, whether Imperial, Soviet, Federal, or Current.

However, while the detailed narrative is on the one hand one of the book's principal strengths, it is also its main weakness. In fact, the book is so overwhelming in detail, with the historical narrative jumping back and forth between the various centuries, that it makes sustained reading a challenge even to the most dedicated of

readers. Furthermore, the book is far too short on analysis until the very final chapters.

An additional issue is that historical fact is intermingled with long literary quotes from Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Lermontov, which are at times presented as if indistinguishable from historical reference. Between the literary quotes old and pithy Caucasian aphorisms about the love of battle, independence and weapons are interspersed with personal interviews conducted by the author. These are intended to provide a snapshot into the lives and reactions of the local population to Russian policies. In effect, the book may be too ambitious in trying to do too many things at once; history, travelogue, interviews with leaders like Besayev as well as the average man all shift the focus to different aspects of the conflict, emphasizing different things important to each. For example, the Stalinist deportations (*likvidatsia*) feature prominently in the book, although the author provides insufficient analysis about why Russia initiated such harsh measures (and not just against Chechens).

The book often shifts from discussions about Caucasian political culture to very specific differences between the Avars, Kabards, Laks, Ossetians, Andygea, Igush, Dagestanis, and Circassians. At times, the book is much more than a mere exegesis on Chechnya but on Russian “colonial” policy for the North Caucasus as a whole. The author includes detailed histories of Dagestan and Abkhazia, but because of the organization of the book, this information is conveyed in asides and its relevance to the main discussion at hand is not always clear to the reader.

The book also lacks a real understanding of the differences between official and unofficial Islam (for example the Sufi tariqas) across the Caucasus and merely glosses over the role played by Saudi Arabia in radicalizing Chechen Islamic resurgence. At times, the author takes an advocacy position, placing any blame for conflict squarely and virtually uniquely on Russian shoulders. Although it is difficult to examine Russian policies and not see their folly, statements such as: “The Russian response . . . was sick beyond comprehension” (p. 3) might put into question issues of objectivity. Perhaps most problematic of all however, is that in this reviewer’s opinion, the blame for much of the limitations of the book lies with the publishers. By failing to ensure proper structuring and judicious editing, a serious disservice is done to the author. There is extensive repetition from one chapter to the next. While details as font size and chapter length are typically outside the author’s control, these certainly are within the parameters of good publishing, all of which would have made this book far more accessible and enjoyable read.

These issues aside, however, for anyone interested in Chechnya, this book provides such a wealth of detail and is so clearly the result of impressive amounts of research, its strengths certainly outweigh its weaknesses.

Hashim, Ahmed S. *Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 482 pp. \$29.95. ISBN: 0-8014-4452-7

Reviewed by **Professor John R. Ballard, Ph.D.**  
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Washington, DC, USA

Ahmed Hashim has produced the best overall treatment of the insurgency in Iraq to date. His research is solid, as are his impressions of both everyday Iraqi concerns and

insurgent motivations. His analysis is firmly based on a broad range of primary and secondary sources, his own service in Iraq, and his continued dialog with others who have been there, while he serves on the faculty at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Everyone bound for service in Iraq and all those who may commit forces to future engagements of the war on terror should read this book.

Hashim provides a solid historical context for the Iraqi revolt and then addresses in turn the various insurgent groups, describing their origins, motivations, and operational and tactical methodologies. He concludes with a very realistic assessment of the weaknesses of the coalition counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq. Hashim also makes clear the strong influence of the ethnic and sectarian movements that are currently rending Iraqi society. Hashim understands the people of Iraq and shows that he recognizes the complexity of the task confronting the coalition there as well. His insight is equally valuable in both the military and cultural sectors.

Hashim's understanding of Iraqi people is extremely useful in order to comprehend the current state of Iraqi society. He manages to square religious, tribal and ethnic factors along with relative wealth and Ba'ath party influences as he describes the problems in Iraq. Even his description of the complex motive forces that dominated the Iraqi city of Fallujah during 2004 is balanced and insightful. Another extremely valuable section, concerning the role and views of the Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his rejection of Shi'a quietism (pp. 241–247), illustrates well the thoughtful yet realistic appraisals of complex issues that fill every chapter of this book.

The analysis he provides on the motivations of the various subgroups making up the complex movement pitting itself against the coalition in Iraq makes the book well worth the purchase price. He correctly identifies nationalism, honor, revenge and pride as the primary causes of the insurgency (p. 99). And he also includes a focused assessment of the insurgency's weaknesses that should be understood by every American leader involved in the war (pp. 200–213).

*Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq* provides a well focused critique of the coalition effort as well, including the coalition's share in responsibility for the insurgency, the dearth of understanding about Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a issues among American policy makers, [aptly described by Hashim as Sunniphobia and Shiaphilia (pp. 280–288)], a rather inflexible ideological approach (p. 273), over-reliance on kinetic military strengths (using bombs and bullets, instead of bricks and ballots), the difficulty conventional forces have in conducting urban warfare, and perhaps most importantly, the failure to restore some semblance of governance and begin economic development sooner in Iraq after the fall of Saddam (pp. 288–299). Hashim also does a superb job outlining why the Iraqi security forces (police and military) have balked at some of the coalition tactics and taken such a long time to mature (pp. 307–318). He also includes an important comparison between the coalition effort in Iraq and the British experience at counter-insurgency in Malaya (pp. 342–344). In short, he tells us much about ourselves as well as informs us about the "enemy."

Hashim completes his analysis with a chapter entitled "Whither Iraq," wherein he addresses the issues of staying, leaving or muddling through. He notes that the insurgency has devastated Iraq, but also that the coalition presence has been the primary deterrent against civil war (p. 352). He also finally endorses an option that partitions the country along ethnic lines. Hashim ends the book with a hopeful discussion of the coalition success in Tal Afar and the relative progress made in 2005 through the drafting of a constitution and election of a new government, though his focus on

the concerns made evident by the lack of Sunni participation in the national process return him to support the idea of some sort of partition of Iraq to ensure its stable future.

Detailed, well researched and honest, this book is the best source for academics and government officials to get a full impression of the major influences confronting the coalition in Iraq today. Hashim artfully manages to give an “inside view” into motivations and concerns while maintaining an admirably unbiased approach to the numerous emotional issues that have made the Iraq war so divisive among policymakers and soldiers alike. He has spoken to countless American servicemen and Iraqis, and he sprinkles their honest impressions through every section of the book. Although its depth and breadth of analysis is wide and commendable, the book is very readable for both students and practitioners. *Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq* would make an excellent textbook for any study of the insurgency in Iraq or insurgencies in general.

Christoph Reuter, *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 200 pages, ISBN 0-691-11759-4. \$19.95. Translated from the German by Helena Ragg-Kirkby.

Reviewed by **John C. Zimmerman**  
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Christoph Reuter traces the historical phenomenon of suicide attacks to the Assassins, a late 11th century Islamic group that carried out such operations for 170 years. Today, these attacks are seen by Muslim spokesmen as martyrdom operations, not suicide. Hence, those who carry out the attacks, and the religious scholars who justify such actions, do not see any contradiction between Islam’s strict prohibition on suicide and blowing oneself up when fighting an enemy. Eventually, high profile Islamic scholars such as Yusuf Qaradawi, the world’s most influential Muslim spokesman and writer, and Sheikh Tantawi, who heads Egypt’s Al Azhar University, the world’s most prestigious center of Islamic learning, supported the use of such operations against Israeli civilians on the grounds that they were not really innocent. In an interesting twist, it was Saudi scholars who opposed such operations.

The current suicide/martyrdom attacks by Muslims can be traced to the Iran—Iraq war in the early 1980s. Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, used young boys as human minesweepers. They were given keys to wear around their necks that would enable them to enter Paradise when they were killed. Families of the martyrs would be considered heroes and receive extra privileges. However, there were so many deaths that eventually there was a “martyr inflation”, and the Iranian population became disillusioned (p.51) Nevertheless, the idea of martyrdom quickly spread to the Shiite Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon whose best known operation was directed against Western peace keeping forces in 1983. In the early 1990s Palestinian groups such as Hamas adopted the practice to be used primarily against Israeli civilians. Reuter notes, as have many others, that those who carry out such operations are not part of an underclass. “In fact, it is precisely the well educated, rather than the indigent, who take the lead in advocating violence...” (p.109)

Reuter questions the notion that the primary motivation of such attackers is entry into Paradise. He notes that Palestinians “want to be remembered posthumously as heroes, with their pictures on every wall, and they want to carry out God’s will by hastening the liberation of their country” (p.16). In this respect, he also focuses on Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers and the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK). The Tamil Tigers have been carrying out suicide attacks against the Sri Lankan government since the 1980s. However, there is no divine payoff resulting from death. Similarly, the PKK, though comprised of Muslims, has encouraged martyrdom against fellow Muslim Turks with no promise of Paradise. All of the groups that utilize suicide attacks do so because they are unable to launch military offensives in the traditional sense. Hence, suicide is a means to overcome superior forces. However, there are some significant differences among these groups. Both the Tamil Tigers and PKK use females much more than Palestinian jihadists. The Tigers and PKK are also much more dependent on a charismatic personality to inspire the attacks. Reuter notes that when the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured, the attacks ceased when he renounced violence. A further difference is that the Tamil Tigers have forced many youths into their cult like organization. By comparison, the Palestinian martyrdom organizations tend to actively discourage many who voluntarily seek to join them.

Al Qaeda stands in stark contrast to the Palestinians, Tamil Tigers and PKK because it is not a national organization constrained by geographical boundaries and sees its struggle in transnational terms. “The [al Qaeda] network is everywhere and nowhere, using each and every regional conflict as a convenient staging-ground for its global mission. Al Qaeda seeks out and colonizes existing conflicts. . .” (p.17)

Reuter also makes some important observations about the families of Palestinians killed in suicide operations. Such deaths are seen as a reason for celebration, and indeed increase the prestige of the martyrs’ families. However, he cites a psychologist who counsels these families. While the families express pride in their sons’ actions, she observes “how violently they have to keep their voices steady while they’re talking, how they try to stop themselves from falling apart.” (p.112)

Overall, Reuter has provided an excellent overview of the nature of contemporary suicide attacks. The book is well worth reading for all students of this topic.

Jeanne Guillemin. *Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism*. New York: Colombia University Press, 2005. 258 pp. \$18.95. ISBN: 0231129432.

Reviewed by **Robert N. Wesley**  
Vienna, Austria

When asking well-read international affairs-minded pupils what comes to mind when confronted with a book entitled *Biological Weapons*, there seem to be two common reactions. One group generally expresses a somewhat sinisterly muted excitement, anticipating that such a book will divulge the perceived sexy details of weapons born to prey upon the psychological anxiety produced by the threat of uncontrollable bodily degeneration. The second group generally yawns at the idea, shrugging at the thought of either a technically complicated read or a sensationalized post-9/11 scare piece.

Fortunately, Jeanne Guillemin's *Biological Weapons* takes neither of these purposeful paths. Instead, Guillemin soberly recounts the obscure course that biological weapons programs have taken over the past century. Her socio-historical look at the progression of major state programs is refreshingly clean of inaccessible scientific assessments, emotionalized hype, and cacophonous descriptions of specific experimentation. Guillemin's thoroughly researched work maintains a delightful balance between inclusion of necessary technical details and an accessible and intriguing narrative that successfully transitions from the early deliberations of the 1910s through the complexities of developing an effective international regime to counter such weapons.

Guillemin begins almost immediately by describing the historical and human factors that created the setting for the initiation of the first biological weapons programs in Europe. One of the recurring themes that Guillemin approaches is that of the relationship between threat perception and the initiation and direction of weapons programs. This was most evident during the interwar and World War Two eras when the major state research and development programs were initiated. She begins by arguing that the launch of the United Kingdom's program during this period was in some measure a result of this perception of the need to counter or respond to the perceived advances of the German program. Furthermore, biological weapons were seen in Canada, France, UK and USA mainly as deterrent weapons, to be used in reprisal for potential German attacks.

The narrative also provides captivating details of the policymaking process during the World War regarding the proposition, approval and manipulation of direction for these programs. Guillemin does a good job in referencing perceptions to realities when describing the internal justification process for the US and UK programs. The book's vivid portrayal of these early programs was largely accomplished through Guillemin's diligent mining of a bounty of declassified documents hailing from this period.

Guillemin also details the Manchuria-based Japanese program. Unlike the early US and UK programs, Guillemin argues that Japan's was offensively minded. Human experimentation, field trials on actual civilian populations and low-impact attacks on military targets are highlighted for their historical precedence and implications. Guillemin transitions from discussing the Japanese program into the Cold War years by providing perspective on the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to uncover Japanese secrets through securing post-war access to previous Japanese scientists.

The book's coverage of the cold war years rightly pays special attention to the industrialization and emerging offensive postures of the expanding US and Soviet programs. Guillemin's merger into the decision of the Nixon Administration to abandon US offensive biological programs is also handled with a perspective on the contemporaneous programs in the USSR and UK.

After the discussion of international efforts to curb biological weapons, Guillemin then ventures into bioterrorism and related contemporary national security programs of the United States. Although this latter segment of the book continues to exhibit excellent factual accuracy and style, the work would have been better-served through its excision.

The additions seem to stretch the liberties of inclusiveness. For instance, Guillemin's work on the state programs of the UK, US, Japanese and Soviet Union is appealing principally due to the depth of discussion and details. Contrastingly, the sections on the potential non-state activities and the programs of Iran, Israel,

China, North Korea, South Africa, and others are written with very few details and analysis. Limiting the scope would have produced less unanswered questions and a better-rounded piece.

Overall, *Biological Weapons* is an exceptionally well-written and researched work. It is easily digestible by anyone with a general historical understanding of the international security issues of the 20th century and yet detailed enough for those with a more focused interest on non-conventional weapons. The nuances of the decision-making processes have numerous implications for current proliferation problems and even for international policymaking in general. It is well worth the time for those who can spare the requisite four to five hours needed to absorb the essential sections.

Karen J. Greenberg, ed. *Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 257 pp. hardback \$60, ISBN: 0-521-85911-5; paperback \$19.99, ISBN 0-521-67627-4.

Reviewed by **Mark Sedgwick**  
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*Al Qaeda Now* contains the proceedings of a high-profile conference held in Washington, DC in December 2004 (155 pages), to which are appended English translations of a number of the speeches and writings of Osama bin Laden (92 pages). The conference was attended by al-Qaeda specialists such as Peter Bergen, terrorism specialists such as Bruce Hoffman, and a number of policy specialists, journalists, and current or former government security figures. All in all, 25 people made presentations, all save one of which are included. The exception is Marc Sageman on "Who Joins al Qaeda," which would have been interesting to read; the reasons for the omission of his presentation are not given.

The conference consisted of 7 panels: a general one to start with, the one already noted on "Who joins al Qaeda," one on Europe, one on militant Islam in general, one on US policy, one on al-Qaeda's "media strategy," and one on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Not all panelists, however, stuck to their assigned topics. There was much general discussion of wider issues, and in fact the book is as much about US relations with the Muslim world as it is about al-Qaeda. There was also much discussion of what should be done (by the US), not just of what had happened. One consequence of this emphasis on policy and general discussion is that (apart from the Bin Laden communications reprinted at the end) the book as a whole suffers from a shortage of hard data. Rather than giving carefully researched presentations, most panelists seem to have covered what they felt were the most urgent issues.

Many panelists addressed the way in which the pre-9/11 al-Qaeda has since become a common front, or perhaps even the ideology of what Bruce Hoffman called "a global insurgency." Others warned against the trend of lumping together all militant Islamic groups. Peter Bergen and Steve Coll stressed the importance, for those struggling against militant Islamic terrorism, of finding ways of separating die-hards from those "who could be converted to ordinary politics." Michael Scheuer questioned whether Hizbullah, for example, should really be regarded as

an enemy of America, given that at the time of the conference it had carried out no attacks on American interests since 1983. Several participants indicated the importance of purely local issues, especially in Europe and Pakistan.

There was also much discussion of the role of al-Jazeera and the internet, and general agreement that al-Qaeda and its associates were using these new media in a highly professional and effective fashion—and that there wasn't much that anyone could do about that.

There was general recognition that military and security action on the part of the US and its allies was not enough, and that public diplomacy and political initiatives were needed as well. There was much discussion of why America has become so unpopular in the Muslim world—especially in those countries governed by regimes that are US allies, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan. Some ascribed this to specific US policies, notably in Iraq, with regard to Israel and the Palestinians, and in support of regimes perceived as oppressive. Others suspected that any and all US policies would inevitably be greeted with suspicion, given Muslim resentment of non-Muslim power, or (even) the nature of Islam. Some called for robust US action against oppressive “allied” Arab regimes, which (as Salameh Nematt of *al-Hayat* remarked) can hardly be expected to co-operate in their own destruction. Some called merely for the cessation of support for such regimes. One suggestion, from Rohan Gunaratna of Singapore, was that money could be given to NGOs rather than directly to governments. Others felt that oppressive regimes were more in the US interest than the Islamist regimes that might well replace them.

Although there was general agreement that political initiatives were needed, then, there was no agreement about what these initiatives should be. Most participants, however, did agree that public diplomacy would only work in conjunction with appropriate policies. Those best acquainted with the realities of the Muslim world placed most emphasis on the need for attention to be paid to policy.

The book contains a number of interesting perspectives and nuggets of information, and the fact that it is actually a transcript of the conference (including post-presentation question and answer sessions) gives it a certain immediacy. Reading the book is rather like eavesdropping on the conference from an adjacent room. There is also much personal reminiscence (especially from many of the journalists), which makes for good reading, even if it only rarely adds anything much to our understanding of the issues. The row between the *al-Hayat* correspondent and the *al-Jazeera* correspondent, during which each accuses the other of being secretly in the pay of an unpopular regime, is a classic of its kind.

Those interested in terrorism and/or US foreign policy but lacking in substantial first-hand knowledge of the Muslim world will benefit from the insights into Muslim attitudes that some speakers give. Those concerned with public policy at the highest levels would do well to read the book. Although its conclusions may be unremarkable for specialists, there is as yet little sign that government has taken much notice of them. The book is not essential reading for serious students of al-Qaeda or of US-Muslim relations, however, since they will learn little that they do not already know. As is inevitable with any attempt to deal with a current phenomenon, the book is already somewhat dated. It is more about al-Qaeda in December 2004, when the conference was held, than it is about al-Qaeda “now,” as the title promises. As a result, some of the observations it contains were probably more interesting then than they are today.

Hewitt, Christopher. *Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America: A Chronology*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005. 199 pp; cloth \$75.00. ISBN: 0-313-33418-8

Reviewed by **Alisa Stack-O'Connor**

Office of the Secretary of Defense (*Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.*)

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Christopher Hewitt's book *Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America* is a remarkably thorough chronology of incidents of politically-motivated violence in the United States from 1954 to 2004, developed while Hewitt was writing *Understanding Terrorism in America*. In his introduction, the only prose in the text, Hewitt explains his selection criteria, classification of incidents, and sources. Appropriately for a book on domestic US terrorism, Hewitt uses the FBI's definition of terrorism. He uses "political violence" in the title to be inclusive of incidents of violence against police and military targets. (Some would argue that these are legitimate targets of warfare and therefore not "terrorism;" the term "political violence" is more inclusive.)

Like most serious terrorism scholars, Hewitt acknowledges that this definitional issue makes distinguishing terrorism from general crime difficult. In the case of domestic US terrorism, he notes this difficulty is compounded by distinguishing political violence from "terrorist-style incidents" from "hate crimes" (p. viii). He resolves this dilemma by looking at how perpetrators are organized: planned violence by organized groups is considered terrorism while spontaneous attacks are considered hate crimes or terrorist-style violence. He breaks domestic US terrorism into nine categories: anti-abortion; black militant; Cuban; environmental/animal rights; Islamic; Jewish; Puerto Rican nationalist; Revolutionary leftist; and White racist/rightist (p. xi). Incidents are listed chronologically noting the type of attack followed by the category of the perpetrator. The book contains name and subject indexes to aid in finding specific incidents. Hewitt's explanation of his criteria for inclusion and general summary of domestic US terrorism is, like the text itself, a quick, easy reference with one omission—he neglects to explain why he selected 1954 as a starting point. That question and the extent of the chronology, however, intrigued me enough to add *Understanding Terrorism in America* to my reading list. Hopefully, Hewitt explains the historic importance of 1954 in that book.

This text is probably one-of-kind. Such comprehensive examinations of US-domestic terrorism are limited and the data, as Hewitt's source list demonstrates, is difficult to find and compile in a systematic way. However, in this day and age, one wonders why Praeger elected to publish it as a book rather than on CD or as a web-based database, like MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database (<http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp>). (Incidentally, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database includes terrorist incidents within the United States, but is not listed as one of Hewitt's sources.) This chronology would likely be more useful to students and researchers as an electronic publication. It would probably also be easier for Hewitt and others to update on a regular basis. Given the amount of work that obviously went into this reference guide and the dynamism of the topic, it would be nice to see it as a living database accessible to scholars, officials, and the general public. Such a database would truly be unique and fill a void in terrorism research.

## Jihad, Theory and Practice: A Review Essay

David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 259 pages, ISBN 0-520-24448-6. \$19.95 Paper.

Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur'an to bin Laden*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. xxvi, 594 pages, ISBN 1-4039-3372-3. \$23.80. Hardcover.

Andrew G. Bostom, *Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*. Amherst: New York: Prometheus, 2005. 759 pages, \$19.14, ISBN 1-59102-307-6. \$29.00 Hardcover.

Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, viii, 277 pages, ISBN 1-4039-7074-2. \$15.72, Paper.

Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, xii, 345 pages. ISBN 10-0-521-79140-3. \$17.82 Paper.

Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 243 pages, ISBN 0-300-11306-4. \$16.50 Paper.

Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*. London: Pluto Press, 2005, vi, 258 pages, ISBN, 0 7453 2283 2. \$19.33 Paperback.

Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, eds., *Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam*. Houston: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986. Reissued in 2005, ix, 281 pages, ISBN 0-932625-00-2. \$24.95 Paperback.

Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*. Westport: Praeger, 2005, xii, 261 pages, \$44.95, ISBN 0-275-98591-1. \$44.95 Hardcover.

Reviewed by **John C. Zimmerman**

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### Introduction

The word jihad, which can be a noun or a verb, derives from the Arabic verb *jahada*. Literally, jihad means to strive, to struggle or to exert oneself. The Quran (Sura 2:218) speaks of "striving in the path of Allah" (*jihad fi sabil Allah*). This raises two questions. First, what does it mean to strive in the path of Allah? Second, how do contemporary proponents of jihad believe it should be implemented?

Princeton University's Patricia Crone, a world-renowned authority on the formative and medieval periods of Islam, writes: "In classical law [750-1258] jihad is missionary warfare. It is directed against infidels [non-Muslims] who need not be guilty of any act of hostility against Muslims . . . its aim is to incorporate the infidels in the abode of Islam, preferably as converts, but alternatively as dhimmis [non-Muslims living under Muslim rule] until the whole world has been subdued."<sup>1</sup> Anne-Marie Delcambre, a professor of Arabic at the Lycee Louis-le Grand in Paris who has written extensively on Islam, observes that there are two possible meanings for jihad, one spiritual and the other warlike. However, "throughout the history of Islam, it has been the material and warlike meaning that has been by far the most important."<sup>2</sup> Yusuf Qaradawi, the Arab world's foremost and best known authority on Islam, equates *jihad fi sabil Allah* with fighting and writes that it has more merit than one who spends his nights in prayer and days in fasting.<sup>3</sup>

In Islamic law jihad is the only kind of war that “has been sanctioned and regulated.” Among Westerners, jihad is often thought of and translated as holy war. Rudolph Peters argues that the definition of jihad as warfare against non-Muslims does not necessarily mean that the war is being fought for religious motives because there has been a question whether the real reason for the wars was the desire among Muslims for territorial expansion.<sup>4</sup> Thus, jihad could serve as a religious justification for more worldly motives.

Some commentators draw a distinction between the greater jihad as being a spiritual struggle against one’s passions and the lesser jihad as being warfare. The idea of a greater jihad as being peaceful is advanced in some of the current literature. However, the greater jihad is attributed to a hadith, or tradition, of the Prophet Muhammad. There are six canonical sets of hadiths. The most authoritative of these are considered by Muslims to be those of Sahih Bukhari. The 199 references to jihad in the Bukhari hadiths are to warfare.<sup>5</sup> An examination of all six hadith collections failed to turn up any reference to a greater jihad as a spiritual struggle.<sup>6</sup> It has been observed that the idea of a greater jihad against one’s passions “is an understanding of the term rarely used by Muslims themselves.”<sup>7</sup> However, in one of the hadith collections considered by Muslim jurists to be less authoritative, the Prophet Muhammad is quoted as saying that the best jihad is to say a just word to a tyrannical ruler.<sup>8</sup>

There are two types of jihad relating to warfare. Defensive jihad is the responsibility of each individual (*fard ayn*) in the community when Muslims are attacked. Offensive jihad is a collective obligation (*fard kafiya*) of the Muslims. Thus, not every individual need take part in offensive jihad. The purpose of offensive jihad is to spread Islam’s boundaries and implement God’s rule.<sup>9</sup> However, forced conversion of the unbelievers is forbidden. Rather, non-Muslims living under Muslim rule, known as *Dhimmi*s, who do not want to convert must (1) pay a special tax known as the *jizya* and (2) allow the Muslims to carry on proselytizing activities.

Indiscriminate killing is forbidden when jihad is being waged. The classic manual by Shaybani (d. 804) cites the Prophet Muhammad as saying when he sent out a detachment: “Do not cheat or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate or kill children, women or old men.” However, it was at the discretion of the Imam (Muslim leader) whether male captives would be killed or enslaved.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the Muslim jurists al Mawardi<sup>11</sup> (d. 1072) and Ibn Taymiyya<sup>12</sup> (d. 1328) forbade the killing of innocents.

There is a question as to exactly what constitutes defensive jihad. When al Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden issued his declaration against “Jews and Crusaders” in February 1998, stating that any American could be killed, he called it an individual duty, thus putting it within the framework of defensive jihad.<sup>13</sup> Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden’s mentor, who called for the formation of al-Qaeda in 1988, placed the reconquest of Andalusia (Muslim Spain from the 8th through 15th centuries), Burma and the Philippines within the framework of defensive jihad by calling it an “individual obligation” even though these countries have less than a 5% Muslim population.<sup>14</sup> He also stated that “Jihad in God’s will means killing the infidels in the name of God and raising the banner of His Name.”<sup>15</sup> Ayman al Zawahiri, the number two leader in al Qaeda, recently stated that jihad seeks the liberation of Palestine (including Israel itself) “and to liberate every land that used to be a territory of Islam from Spain to Iraq.”<sup>16</sup> He said that the obligation for jihad fell on every Muslim, thus an individual duty to be classified as defensive jihad.<sup>17</sup>

For the legitimacy of offensive jihad Yusuf Qaradawi, the aforementioned world’s most influential Sunni Islamist, cites two schools of thought, one for and

one against. He then states that there are three reasons that the issue cannot be settled at present. The third reason is that “we depend on others for military power. Those against whom we want to launch our offensive jihad are the same people who make all sorts of weapons and sell them to us . . . . This being the case, how can we talk of launching an offensive jihad to subject the whole world to our message . . . .”<sup>18</sup> The clear implication is that the situation could change.

### Recent Books

David Cook’s *Understanding Jihad* will become a classic study on the topic. He masterfully examines the Quranic verses where jihad is mentioned. He notes that not all of the references to jihad mean warfare. However, there are verses where the clear intent means warfare, and it is these verses that were used as justification for the 1000 years of Islamic expansion from the 7th through 17th centuries throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, Europe and the India. Cook delves deeply into the hadith literature and commentary by leading Muslim jurists dating from the eighth century. Most of this literature acknowledges the martial nature of jihad. Cook also examines the heavenly rewards martyrs are told they can expect, a topic not always covered in literature on jihad.

Cook is very critical of those Western scholars and Muslim apologists who promote the idea of “greater jihad” as a spiritual struggle against one’s passions. He accuses them of defying “all the religious and historical evidence to the contrary.” (p.40) The reason for this misrepresentation, according to Cook, is to present Islam in the most favorable light possible. He observes that “no Muslim, writing in a non-Western language (such as Arabic, Persian, Urdu) would ever make claims that jihad is primarily nonviolent or has been superseded by the spiritual jihad.” (pp.165–166) Cook notes that when current day jihadists want to issue a communication, “[i]n almost all cases it begins with a Qur’anic verse or a hadith that illustrates or supports the subject of the message.” (p.147) Thus, jihad as warfare has religious roots.

Cook concludes by observing that Muslims have yet to critically examine the jihad conquests. “The problem may lie in the unwillingness to confront the fact that the conquests were basically unjustified. They were not a ‘liberation’ and were not desired by the non-Muslim peoples; they were endured and finally accepted.” (p.167) Thus, there has been an unwillingness to compare the Islamic conquests to European colonial conquests, “a comparison that to an outside observer seems quite natural and obvious.” (p.167) A consequence of such a failure has been extensive rationalization of the Islamic conquests which “in the end opens the door to those, such as radical Muslims and most especially globalist radical Muslims, who embrace the conquests and seek to continue them.” (p.167)

Richard Bonney’s *Jihad: From Qu’ran to bin Laden* is a very ambitious work in its depth and range. He examines the history of the ideology of jihad from the 7th century to the present and its geographic expansion starting the Arabian Peninsula, moving throughout the Middle East and Persia, on to North Africa and Spain, the rise of the Ottoman Empire and Mughal Empire in the India, the expansion into Sub Saharan Africa, the rise of Wahhabism in Arabia, the period when jihad was seen as a defense against colonialism, the struggle against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, to the present conflict in Palestine, and the rise of al Qaeda. He also discusses the views of some classical jurists – a minority, to be sure – who only viewed defensive jihad as being justified. Thus, Bonney provides a comprehensive

overview for understanding the historical frame of reference for current day jihadists and their critics.

Bonney is very critical of U.S. Middle East policy, and this leads him to drift off into complaints about American policies in Cuba and Central America. His assertion that the U.S. had implicitly accepted that Islam and democracy were incompatible is not supported. (The book was published before the 2005 elections in Iraq). This view often overlooks the fact that the U.S. must deal with the regimes as it finds them, not as it would like them to be. The claim that the early Islamic conquests won over "hearts and minds" (p.54) of the conquered people should be evaluated in light of Andrew Bostom's book, reviewed next. Bonney seeks to encourage a "modern, enlightened Islam" (p.404) that will stress the peaceful greater jihad instead of the warlike lesser jihad, even though most his work is devoted to jihad as warfare. Nevertheless, Bonney has provided a valuable and comprehensive reference for researchers.

A topic that is often overlooked when jihad is being analyzed is the fate of the people who fell under its control. Andrew Bostom addresses this issue in *Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*. Bostom presents a lengthy essay describing the brutality of the Muslim conquests and the living conditions of the conquered under Muslim rule who were known as Dhimmis. He then presents a number of documents and writings from a wide variety of sources detailing such subjects as the nature of the conquests, the impact on the conquered peoples, and the enslavement of many of those conquered. The geographical scope of the conquered extends from the Middle East to Europe to Africa and to India. The time frame extends from the seventh century conquests to the more recent issue of slavery in the Sudan.

Bostom does not share the view expressed by some that the conquests were benign or benefited the conquered. Instead, through the documents and writings reproduced, he presents the conquests and their aftermath as they were viewed by those who came under Muslim rule as well as the attitudes of the conquerors. He also reproduces writings from many experts on these topics. Bostom thus follows the methodology of scholars who attempt to give the victims and perpetrators of colonial expansion their own voice. One can take issue with Bostom that the Armenian genocide by the Turks during the First World War was religiously motivated as opposed to issues having to do with geopolitics (i.e. fear of Russia). Nevertheless, *Legacy of Jihad* does provide an often overlooked perspective on the Islamic jihad conquests and expansion.

Walid Phares is a frequent commentator on Islamist issues on American television, and has also appeared on the Arab television channel Al Jazeera. In *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America*, he is critical of the attempt by some academics to claim that jihad means something other than warfare. He notes that when he grew up in Lebanon everyone there understood what the term really meant. He sees the attempt to sanitize jihad as part of an effort to mislead the West as to the true extent of the danger it faces. He observes that Western textbooks present the Islamic conquests in a more benign manner than the ones in Arab countries. On the other hand, historians in both the Arab world and the West "continue to deny that those armies marching out of the Arabian peninsula [in the 7th century] were simply conquerors." (p.27)

Phares argues that the U.S. had no strategy to deal with terrorism prior to 9/11. He writes that he had been warning of the rise of militant Islam for many years prior

to the attacks. However, the U.S. “was not prepared either culturally or psychologically for the attacks . . .” (p.173) In this respect, Phares is critical of the Western intervention in Kosovo to save Muslims from being slaughtered but doing nothing to save the hundreds of thousands of Southern Sudanese non-Muslims who were being killed by the Islamist regime in the north. He attributes the lack of Western understanding on these issues to the media in general, Western academics who have minimized the threat of militant Islam and Saudi Arabian penetration of American institutions.

Phares recommends that in order to counter the potential of a future attack, the U.S. issue a declaration defining jihadism as the enemy and support civil society in Arab and Muslim countries. He emphasizes that any such declaration clearly state that the war is not against Islam. He also sees the education of Westerners about the root causes, identity and mechanisms of jihadism as a first step towards a defense against terrorism. Although much of Phares’ overall scenario of the threat faced by the U.S. could be viewed as alarmist, similar criticisms would probably have been forthcoming prior to 9/11.

There is a tendency to lump all jihadists and Muslim radicals together. Fawaz Gerges challenges this view in *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. He offers a fascinating look into the inner workings of jihadist ideologues. The “far enemy” is a term developed by jihadists. It refers primarily to the United States and its Western allies. The near enemy refers to governments in the Arab world who, in the view of jihadists, are lackeys of the United States. Gerges has interviewed many jihadists and read much of the recent memoirs by former radicals. He distinguishes the religious nationalists from the transnationalist jihadists. The former wanted to bring down Arab governments, the near enemy, while the transnationalists wanted to focus on the far enemy. A major catalyst for the decision to attack the “far enemy” was the presence of United States troops in Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina. They were there following the war with Iraq in 1991.

Gerges traces the rift among jihadists as beginning as far back as the war in Afghanistan. The war coincides with the rise of the “Afghan Arabs,” who went to fight in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Ayman al Zawahiri, the number two man in al Qaeda, convinced bin Laden to wage war against Arab governments after the war was over. He was opposed by Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor, who wanted to fight on behalf of oppressed Muslims in places like Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir. Azzam was killed under mysterious circumstances, and Zawahiri won the day. Eventually, the al Qaeda leadership decided that the best way to bring down Arab governments was to neutralize their major patron, the United States.

Gerges shows that many jihadists and militants bitterly opposed this move as foolish and suicidal to the Islamic movement. Former militants lay the blame on bin Laden, who, they argue, was told what he wanted to hear by subordinates. They are very critical of Bin Laden’s authoritarian style of leadership. Bin Laden had irrationally convinced himself that the U.S. could be driven out of the Middle East in the same way that the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan. Bin Laden and the transnationalists overlooked the very substantial aid the Afghan resistance received from the U.S. that allowed them to oust the Soviets.

Gerges also offers some very interesting insights. For example, he notes that jihadists “are as much opposed to Western liberal ideas as to Western foreign policies.” (p.48) They were quick to condemn the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s wife for dancing with the President Jimmy Carter. He also discusses how bin Laden

set up a salary structure for al Qaeda and some of the internal dissensions this caused. Gerges concludes, as have many others, that the United States invasion of Iraq has breathed new life into the transnationalist jihadists.

Mary Habeck traces the ideological origins of the present day jihadist movements in *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. She is critical of Western scholars who seek to find political, social or economic causes for jihadism instead taking religion seriously. She examines the ideas of Muslim thinkers from the classical period to the present. In particular, she credits Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who formulated a religious justification for overthrowing governments that do not follow Sharia (Islamic law), as being the principle historical influence on jihadists. She notes that the call for offensive jihad by militants "is simply a recounting of the interpretations of the most respected *traditional* Islamic authorities." (p.117, emphasis in original)

The current Islamist views on the clash of civilizations between the West and Islam are analyzed. Habeck acknowledges, in this respect, the jihadist tendency to see vast conspiracies directed by the West against Islam. She places particular emphasis on the influence of the 20th century Islamist thinkers Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, Hassan al Banna and Sayyid Qutb for the development of the hostile ideologies of their current followers. Essentially, Habeck argues that the current day proponents of jihad are not really interested in making a distinction between offensive and defensive jihad.

Habeck provides useful insights into the writings and ideas of people and organizations that might otherwise be overlooked. In one memorable example, she cites the idea by an Islamist that Muslims could democratically be elected in one of the U.S. 50 states and then establish Sharia. Once the rest of America saw the benefits of Sharia, it would gladly follow. This is perhaps an excellent illustration of the delusion many Islamists labor under. One may question Habeck's acceptance of the idea of a greater jihad as a spiritual struggle. Nevertheless, she has provided valuable insights into the origins of current jihadist thinking.

Farhad Khosrokhavar's *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs* is an excellent study on the underlying motivation for martyrs waging jihad in Iran, Palestine and Europe. He notes that Muslim martyrs differ from earlier Christian martyrs in that the later would sacrifice their lives without killing. "... Muslim martyrs are intended to destroy a world in which there is no place for them as citizens of a nation or of an Islamic community." (p.25) Very youthful fighters were programmed by Khomeini's revolution during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Death was inspired by the despair in Iranian society. The youth fell under the cult-like control of mullahs who extolled the value of martyrdom. Hence, the martyrs "became incapable of conceiving life outside this closed world" (p.96) and considered themselves "superior beings who were different from the rest." (p.104)

Unlike Iran, it was non-state actors who encouraged martyrdom in Palestine. Khosrokhavar notes that none of the 150 people involved in suicide bombings was "illiterate, wretchedly poor or even depressed by his surroundings." (p.129) Anger at the policies of Israel outweighed middle class concerns. These martyrs were also aware that HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, with the help of Saudi Arabia, would generously provide for their families after their deaths. However, people are not encouraged to become martyrs. Rather, unlike Iran, they are often discouraged from this path. Places like cafes and discotheques in Israel are chosen as targets "[b]ecause their puritanical vision of Islam is reinforced by the bitterness that comes from seeing the very people who refuse them access to the benefits of modernity having a good

time.” (p.132) Death allows them not only to enter Paradise but “releases them from their everyday humiliation.” (p.133)

Al Qaeda’s “transnational neo-umma” members in Europe are angry at what they perceive as “Western arrogance.” Khosrokhavar interviewed a number of imprisoned Muslims. He found that many were multi-lingual and studied in universities. “I was not dealing with individuals who were disoriented because they had difficulty in adapting to the West or because of their lack of cultural baggage” (p.154). Nevertheless, they see the West as evil incarnate that is trying to destroy Islam. They view their martyrdom as a challenge to Western economic, military and technological superiority. Western culture is perceived as sinful and pernicious. “They reject Western society as a whole. They want to fight it . . . and identify it with a mythical unity that legitimizes the use of blind violence against it.” (p.179) They are greatly disturbed by the position of Western women and sexual liberation.<sup>19</sup>

In Shiite Islam the idea of offensive jihad has, in theory, been abandoned until the 12th Imam, who disappeared in 874, returns from his Occultation (concealment). Only defensive jihad is currently recognized.<sup>20</sup> *Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam* presents the writings of the influential Iranian Ayatollahs Taleqani and Mutahhari and the late highly influential intellectual Ali Shariati.

Taleqani writes that war is inevitable unless the human instinct changes, but that current human instincts dictate war. The issue then becomes for what cause war will be waged. There is war for God and war for tyrants. He writes that “war is natural and instinctive and man cannot do without it . . . a perfect religion [Islam], unlike Christianity, recognizes the necessity of warfare . . . Only a religion [Islam] which recognizes the geometry of human instincts and makes a plan according to it can govern the world.” (p.53) The Islamic jihad is seen as the instrument for liberating the world and bringing truth to it. Taleqani identifies four types of jihad: (1) against foreigners to advance the faith (i.e. offensive jihad), (2) defensive jihad, (3) against protected religious minorities who rebel against the Islamic government and (4) against unjust rulers.

Ayatollah Mutahhari’s views are very similar to Taleqani’s. However, he places all jihads within a defensive framework. Thus, the liberation of mankind is defensive even though for practical purposes there is no distinction between this liberation and traditional offensive jihad. He saw two types of oppression: (1) against Muslims and (2) against non-Muslims whose rulers do not allow them to hear the message of Islam. Hence, a jihad for the “expansion of human values” (p.117) is defensive even when the people who are the object of the liberation are not having their lives and property threatened.

Martyrdom is more prominent among Shiites than Sunnis because of the death of Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, at Karbala in 680. Taleqani views the martyr (*shaheed*) as making the ultimate sacrifice for truth “with the intention of intimacy with God, not on the basis of fantasies and personal desires.” (p.68) Mutahhari saw martyrdom (shahadat) in broad societal terms. Thus, “[e]very drop” of the martyr’s blood “is turned into hundreds of thousands of drops, nay into tons of blood, and is transfused into the body of his society.” (p.136) For Ali Shariati, martyrdom “is not a death which is imposed by the enemy upon our warriors. It is death which is desired by our warriors. . . .” (p.194) He also argued that martyrdom is superior to jihad because one can be a martyr when waging jihad is not possible.

The most important influence from the twentieth century on current day jihadists is Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966).<sup>21</sup> His far reaching influence is noted in all of the

above books being reviewed here. Adnan Musallam has written a masterful and lucid biography in *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*, the only biography of Qutb in English. In stark contrast to his best known contemporaries-Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi and Ayatollah Khomeini-Qutb did not start out as an Islamist. Rather, he was a well known secular poet and literary critic in Egypt before becoming an Islamist in the 1940s. In fact, as Musallam notes, Egypt's Nobel Prize winner for literature, Naguib Mahfouz, credits Qutb (and another literary critic) with making his work known to the public.

Musallam shows a side of Qutb, prior to becoming an Islamist, that is rarely seen. Thus, Qutb was frustrated in what appears to be his only romantic love interest, grieved over the death of his mother and suffered health problems. From the late 1940s through his ten year imprisonment beginning in 1954, Qutb began to advocate a society governed by Islamic law as the only real solution to Muslims' problems. His 21 month stay in the United States from 1948 to 1950 "reinforced his earlier belief that the Islamic way of life was man's only salvation from the abyss of godless capitalism." (p.119) His best known work, published in 1964 and translated into English as *Milestones*, set forth the justification for jihad as a way to overcome societal ignorance and ungodly regimes. He was executed for this work in 1966 by the Egyptian regime.

The importance of this biography is that Musallam shows that even a fairly secular writer like Qutb can become a jihadist. He was about 40 when he became an Islamist ideologue. Thus, for those who wonder how a seemingly progressive individual can end up a jihadist, Qutb offers the quintessential example. Interestingly, even during his secular literary phase Qutb was very combative. He carried this quality over to his Islamist writings. Musallam also details Qutb's influence on contemporary militants.

## Conclusion

While there are many views on jihad, the most authoritative hold that it means warfare for the sake of Allah. This interpretation is only likely to be reinforced in the future.

## Notes

1. Patricia Crone, *God's Rule: Government and Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 364–365. Also published in Scotland as *Medieval Islamic Political Thought*.
2. Anne-Marie Delcambre, *Inside Islam* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005), p. 17.
3. Yusuf Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam* (New Delhi: Saeed International, n.d.), p. 234.
4. Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam* (London: Brill, 1977), pp. 3–4
5. Douglas Streusand, "What Does Jihad Mean", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (September 1997) at <http://www.meforum.org/article/357>.
6. Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (New York: Oxford, 1999), pp. 139–140, note 19; Rudolph Peters, "The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern Islam," in Rudolph Peters, ed., *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Marcus Wiener, 1996), p. 116.
7. R.K. Pruthi, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Jihad* (New Delhi: Anmol, 2002) Vol. 1 (of 5 volumes) p. 1. See also pp. 62–63 on the unreliability of the greater jihad hadith. On jihad meaning war see pp. 63–71. These volumes should not be confused with an al-Qaeda publication of the same name.

8. Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam*, p. 17. The reference is to the Sunan Dawud collection. The collections considered by Muslim jurists to be most authoritative are those of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim.

9. John Kelsay, *Islam and War* (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1993), pp. 35–36, 46; Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 92

10. Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1966), pp. 91, 92, 100.

11. Harfiyah Abdel Salleem, Oliver Ramsbotham, Saba Risaluddin and Brian Wicker, *The Crescent and the Cross: Muslim and Christian Approaches to War and Peace* (London: MacMillan, 1998), p. 78.

12. Ibn Taymiyya, "The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad" in Peters ed., *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, pp. 49–50.

13. Text in Bruce Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 58–62. Citation on p. 61.

14. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: On the Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 147.

15. *Jihad* magazine, Issue 27, February 1987 in Peter Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 35.

16. *New York Times*, 28 July 2006, p. A 16.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase* (Swansea: Awakening Publications, 2000), p. 122.

19. For an analysis, see John C. Zimmerman, "Roots of Conflict: The Islamist Critique of Western Values", *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 425–458.

20. E. Kohlberg, "The Development of the Imam Shi'i Doctrine of Jihad," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Vol. 126, No. 1 (1976), especially pp. 78–86.

21. See John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Summer 2004), pp. 222–252. See also Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 7–31, 36–37, 79–80, 131.