

Book Reviews

Milton Leitenberg. *The Problem of Biological Weapons*. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2004. 206 pp., \$27.00, ISBN: 9-189-68327-7.

Milton Leitenberg. *Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2005. 115 pp. Text available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/FILES/PUB639.pdf>. ISBN: 1-584-87221-7.

Reviewed by **John Ellis van Courtland Moon**
Fitchburg State College,
Fitchburg, Massachusetts, USA

The war against terrorism is, in many respects, like no other. The enemy is largely invisible. There are no defined battle lines. The form of attack is hard to predict, and the end recedes into a hazy future. It is not surprising, therefore, that this war has become encrusted with myths that make it more difficult to fight. Two works by the noted biological warfare expert, Milton Leitenberg, should be required reading for every public official in the United States government. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent anthrax letter of September–October 2001 have created a bipartisan ship of fear among those most responsible for our security. The likelihood and the magnitude of future biological attacks have been exaggerated until some scenarios have come to resemble attacks delivered by superhuman beings, credited by some with a capability for genetic engineering.

Senator Bill Frist (Republican, Tennessee), assuming the mantle of a prophet, has warned that a bioterrorism attack is “inevitable,” and that no special expertise is required to launch a “first-order” biological weapons (BW) attack. He is not alone in sounding his apocalyptic warning. In November 1997, Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, placed a five-pound bag of sugar on a table at a Sunday morning TV show and announced that an equal amount of anthrax could kill as many as 95,000 people if launched over a large city. Other public spokesmen have envisioned a BW attack as a biological tsunami exterminating thousands in its apocalyptic path.

There are three underlying assumptions beneath these dire predictions: a biological attack is inevitable, it is imminent, and it will be highly successful. No attention is paid to meteorological and other factors that will determine the degree to which any use of BW is successful. Moreover, the historical record is ignored. Milton Leitenberg notes the failure of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, to launch a BW attack despite several years of trying, and the primitive nature of the Al Qaeda attempt to acquire a biological warfare capability.

In both works under review, Leitenberg emphasizes the five key requirements to launching a successful biological attack:

- One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen.
- One must know how to handle the organism correctly.
- One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics.

- One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up production properly.
- One must know how to disperse the product properly.

[*The Problem of Biological Weapons*, page 35]

None of the above steps are easy.

In the U.S. the most sophisticated biological event to date was the delivery of the Ames anthrax strain through the mail in the fall of 2001. Although it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions until the perpetrator or perpetrators are identified, Leitenberg puts the anthrax episode in context. Twenty-two cases occurred; five fatalities were incurred. In contrast, naturally caused diseases kill millions each year. For example, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis reportedly slew six million people in 2004. Moreover, every day, humans manage to poison themselves. Smoking alone causes the death of 13,500 people daily and five million annually. Obesity-related illnesses and vehicular accidents injure or kill thousands each year. One of the unfortunate effects of the emphasis on bioterrorism has been a downscaling of public health due to an overemphasis on a currently hypothetical threat.

As Milton Leitenberg stresses, this emphasis ironically creates a danger unintended by the alarmists. It raises the value of biological weapons in the eyes of terrorists and rogue nations. Historically, the uses of biological agents have been limited to incidents: the injection of horses with glanders and anthrax in American ports and other localities during World War I or the 1984 poisoning of salad bars by the Rajneesh cult in Oregon. Biological warfare on the scale of chemical warfare in World War I or the Iran/Iraq War has not taken place. The U.S. military planners who worked on the American offensive program from 1941 to 1969 were keenly aware that the value of biological weapons would only be proven once they were extensively used in war. So far, this kind of war has not happened.

Fear is always a poor counselor. Perhaps the most potentially dangerous consequences of the U.S. government's reaction to the BW threat falls on the observance of the Biological Weapons Convention. The weakness of that treaty lies in its lack of a verification provision. Without an agreed Verification Protocol, its effectiveness has come to depend on the degree of transparency exercised by State Parties regarding any activities that may be viewed by other nations as a violation of the Convention. The United States in the past ten years has carried out a number of projects that have alarmed BW arms control experts. Three such projects were launched in the late 1990s. Project Clear Vision was designed to build a Soviet-designed bomblet and to test it; Project Jefferson aimed at producing a genetically modified strain of anthrax resistant to vaccine; and Project Bacus sought to build a small production facility without being detected. Concerns are also being raised by some of the envisioned projects of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) that push the BW program towards offensive research. The U.S. government has asserted that these projects are "defensive" in intent. But intent is a Trojan horse: the designing of a weapon, increasing the virulence of an agent and building a production facility, challenge the prohibitions of the BWC Convention. And, as Leitenberg points out, no matter how innocent the intentions of the U.S. program, other powers may conclude that they are offensive in intent. The world may already be spiraling towards another biological weapons race.

In *The Problem of Biological Weapons*, Leitenberg ends with a pointed question: "Will any control be possible?" In his second work, he makes a series of wise recommendations: the carrying out of a realistic BW threat assessment, an avoidance of exaggerated statements by panicky government officials, federal priority on the

production of vaccines to deal with pandemic flu strains, protection and strengthening of the BTWC, and finally the establishment of oversight over the BW research program. It would be beneficial if the last recommendation could be safeguarded from partisan evisceration. No matter how good a recommendation may be, its success lies in the quality of its implementation.

Edited by Adam Jones. *Gendercide and Genocide*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, May 10, 2004. 302 pp. \$69.96 (cloth), \$29.95 (paper). ISBN: 0-8265-1444-8 (cloth), 0-8265-1445-6 (paper)

Reviewed by **Alisa Stack-O' Connor**
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.)

In September 2004, then Secretary of State Colin Powell called the mass killings by Sudanese military and paramilitaries in Darfur, Sudan “genocide.” The word was carefully chosen. The U.S. government, like other governments and the United Nations, uses the word “genocide” purposefully, particularly after the criticism of the response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in which officials shied away from saying “genocide”—instead using the awkward construct “acts of genocide.” Consequently, many governments and international organizations have been accused of using semantics to avoid action. Adam Jones’ book *Gendercide and Genocide* is about this dilemma between words and actions.

Gendercide and Genocide is a compilation of eleven essays, of which seven were previously published in the *Journal of Genocide Research*. Adam Jones’ work forms the basis for the book’s central question: “Does gender matter in genocide?”—a question to which Jones and many of the other authors answers “yes.” Jones’s argument builds upon Mary Anne Warren’s work, *Gendercide: The Implication of Sex Selection*, in which she coined the term “gendercide” as a sex-neutral word to describe the “deliberate extermination of persons of a particular sex” (Jones, p. 3). Although gendercide is meant to include both males and females, Jones notes that it has generally only been applied to attacks on women, even though “noncombatant men have been and continue to be the frequent targets of mass killing and genocidal slaughter” (p. 3). His point that battle-age males, regardless of their combatant status, are the first to go in war and genocide is so obvious that it is assumed in many treatments of political violence. Jones challenges the acceptability of this assumption, and forces us to take notice. The focus on women as victims and men as perpetrators of political violence has, in Jones’s view, skewed research and activism.

His work is well argued and succeeds in his goal to “‘engender’ the debate” (p. 16) as the following chapters show. Evelin Gerda Lindner takes the “gender challenge” beyond the individual and looks at how humiliation is used in gender-specific ways as a tool of political violence. She echoes Jones’ argument that men are usually the forgotten victims of conflict because “women have claimed a monopoly in this sphere” (p. 54). According to Lindner and David Buchanan, in his chapter on gendercide and human rights, the killing of males because they are males will only be recognized as a problem when human rights are recognized as universal, individual rights.

Of the book, Oystein Gullvag Holter's chapter "A Theory of Gendercide," is the most comprehensive, highlighting the interplay between normal conditions and genocide, that is, normal race, gender, and political roles and practices in a society set the baseline and character for genocide. Like Jones, he notes that the targeted killing of males may be an early warning sign of genocide, not simply the start of a war or a "minor" human rights abuse. More clearly than Jones, he argues that gender is just one of many variables in conflict and genocide. To effectively understand genocide and gendercide, Holter states that researchers should examine how these variables interact. Again, more explicitly than other authors in the book, Holter examines how gender stereotypes obscure the roles women and men take on in conflict and genocide. He rightly notes that just as the victim status of men is underreported, so is the "aggressor status of women" (p. 73). He also captures how gender stereotypes solidify in the face of conflict resulting in the interesting irony that at the same time masculinity is being equated with "warrior" and a lack of caring, men participating in the conflict show great caring for each other. However, because men are thought of as uncaring and violent, the world permits them to fight and die.

Two authors, Stuart Stein and R. Charli Carpenter, take issue with the idea of "gendercide" as outlined by Jones. Stein provides a good overview of the terms human rights activists, lawyers, historians, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists use to describe the various "cides." He points out that the field of genocide studies lacks a coherent approach or theory. As such, adding "gendercide" to the mix does little to help analysts. In his critique, one sees parallels between the study of genocide, gender, and terrorism. In all three, the specialists who study these phenomena dispute the very definition of the problems. In looking at terrorism and genocide (and probably gender), advocates often try to solve a political problem with legislation. By turning to the law, some attempt to make fuzzy, gray political problems into black and white solutions. The careful use of the term "genocide," as in the examples of Rwanda and Sudan, reflects this approach—as does the sometimes indiscriminate use of the word "terrorism." To label political violence "genocide" is supposed to be a call to action—a reflection of the international promise "never again." Stein's criticism of "gendercide" calls out weakness in the gendercide theory, but perhaps more importantly he shows that, like terrorism and pornography, genocide is hard to define, but you know it when you see it (unfortunately often too late).

Carpenter, like Stein, takes issue with Jones's characterization of gendercide and the confusion of terms and variables in gendercide analyses. She notes that gendercide may be a part of genocide, but it is not genocide in itself. In fact, she persuasively argues that no gendercide—the killing of individuals solely because of their gender—has ever taken place. In calling out the differences between "gender" and "sex," Carpenter hits on a key point that the gendercide authors neglect—concepts of gender and gender roles are subconscious. Men are not targeted because they are male; rather, because they tend to fill roles, such as soldier and politician, that make them a threat to the adversary. Genocide is conscious, purposeful killing of a targeted group; gendercide is the unconscious effect of genocide. Thus, killing the men first is a means to a genocidal end, not an end on its own. Carpenter answers "yes" to the question of whether gender matters in genocide, but takes it further in asking why and how.

The chapters by Augusta C. Del Zotto and Stefanie S. Rixecker on black-male gendercide in the United States and using bio-technology to identify and abort homosexuals before they are born, respectively, sharpened Carpenter's and Stein's

arguments. These chapters, while interesting in their own right, did little to further the reader's understanding of gendercide. In fact, they seem to be examples of using the term "genocide" to obtain political attention. These chapters examine important social issues, but do not rise to the level of either gendercide or genocide.

The critiques by Carpenter and Stein of the gendercide theory greatly assisted me in identifying and assimilating key lessons of the book. Notably, women's lives may matter less than men's (e.g., pay gap and sex-selective abortions), but women's deaths matter more. Equating women with children and then equating women and children with non-combatant status is a disservice to everyone. It denies that women have independent thought, action, and responsibility, while unconsciously forcing men into combatant status, ultimately leading to the idea that they are expendable and appropriate targets of political violence.

In his chapter, Buchanan writes that "human-rights reporting is not a zero-sum game in which every word written on male victimization automatically leads to one less word written on female suffering or vice versa" (p. 147). While this should not be the case, after reading this book, it seems to me that it is precisely the case. There appears to be a finite amount of international pity and shame. When governments use the word "genocide," they seem to be saying that a particular mass killing has exceeded their acceptable level of political violence. The debate over what constitutes genocide is a debate over the acceptable level of violence. Highlighting men's deaths as an early warning of genocide is unlikely to be an effective tool as long as: 1) men are considered appropriate targets of political violence; 2) governments cannot agree on what the acceptable level of political violence is within sovereign states and across them; and 3) states remain either unwilling or unable to intervene.

While I believe these are important lessons for and about policy makers, *Gendercide and Genocide* is written for academics and activists. Much of it is a debate internal to gender and genocide studies, a field that before reading this book I did not know existed. Many of the chapters will be useful in teaching a variety of topics from communications to history to medical ethics. The multi-disciplinarian approach is refreshing, and Jones has done a service to many academic fields in opening the debate on gender and genocide.

In the end, this book is about words, how we understand them, and how we react to them. How the general public understands "women" and "men" (as "victim" and "soldier") influences how governments react to political violence. Jones and other authors on gender and gendercide would do a great service to the general understanding of gender and political violence with editorials on this topic in mainstream newspapers and magazines and making this topic more than an academic debate.

Robert M. Cassidy. *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006. 248 pp. \$49.95. ISBN: 0-275-98990-9.

Reviewed by **Phillip D. Wright**
National Security Consultant
Washington, D.C. USA

Robert Cassidy's book discusses the general challenges of counterinsurgency and some successful strategies employed in the past in containing or defeating an

insurgency. He begins the book by persuasively asserting that the United States is not fighting a global War on terror but is faced with a global insurgency. The first part and majority of the book focuses on “big power” (p. 21) militaries and how they are limited by institutional culture in adopting the necessary unconventional tactics to deal effectively with insurgencies. Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy broadly details how the Russian, American, and British armies were shaped by their respective histories and geographies and how those experiences determined strategies for fighting insurgencies. He notes that the British were most successful in dealing with the challenges of unconventional warfare because of their colonial experiences governing a large empire.

The short remainder of the book discusses successful counterinsurgency strategies employed by the American Army against the Apaches and the Viet Cong, the British in Malaysia, Rhodesia’s superb counterinsurgency unit, the Selous Scouts, and finally the French in Algeria. What this reviewer distilled from LTC Cassidy’s writings is that conventional armies, utilizing conventional tactics, mistakenly try to sledgehammer insurgencies into submission, and inevitably fail. He notes that militaries on shoestring budgets are more imaginative in dealing with insurgents because they have to employ limited resources judiciously. He also suggests that a central factor in successful counterinsurgencies such as the British in Malaysia and the American Army against the Apaches is the cooption and deployment of indigenous troops and, when possible, ex-insurgents to successfully strike at and eventually defeat insurgents.

The book concludes with a brief section recommending ways to successfully contain the current global insurgency. He notes the importance of employing indigenous forces, minimal outside force, and the risks associated with using conventional “great power” tactics designed (in the cases highlighted in this book) to fight large-scale European wars. Additionally, he notes the necessity of gaining the support of the local population and that military force is only one part of strategy that includes economic, social, and political elements.

Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror is among the numerous books that have appeared since September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War on the topic of insurgency and terrorism. Does it say anything original? Taken in separate parts, it does not. All of the topics addressed have been amply covered before by several outstanding studies, many of which are footnoted in this book. The fact that conservative organizations like the militaries described in the first half of the book, historically, have been slow to change is common knowledge. This slowness often foreshadowed stunning defeats.

Given LTC Cassidy’s conclusions about successful counterinsurgency strategies, surprisingly, he does not mention the U.S. Army’s involvement in the Greek Civil War from 1947 to 1949. Under General Van Fleet, the U.S. Army directed a very successful counterinsurgency program that employed a small cadre of U.S. advisors and Greek indigenous troops against Greek communists and defeated a well-established guerrilla force that had been active since 1942. This ensured Greece’s entrance into NATO. The Vietnam examples in the book are worth studying. However, the U.S. Army’s and Marine’s counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam were ultimately unsuccessful.

LTC Cassidy uses the Roman Legion as an ancient example of a conservative, casualty-averse military establishment. He points to the Roman disaster in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest against German tribes. He notes that after the defeat, Rome ultimately chose to retreat instead of allowing its army to suffer the casualties

necessary to win a long, unconventional fight. This is a weak analogy. Roman military history covered several centuries and that was just one battle. Generally, Romans were not casualty-averse, and in dealing with hostile tribes, they were both innovative and very effective; the suppression of the Zealots being just one example. His sources on the Roman military include Edward Luttwak, John Keegan, and Hans Delbruck. Delbruck was a great historian but is now dated. Luttwak is an innovative military thinker and an excellent writer. John Keegan is a brilliant military historian. However, none of these authors are experts on Roman affairs. Books by scholars on ancient Rome and its military institutions such as Adrian Goldsworthy and Isaac Benjamin are better sources about the Roman legion and these generally reject the assertions found in LTC Cassidy's book.

Basically, this is a very good survey of well and lesser known studies involving counterinsurgency including several RAND studies and books such as Alistair Horne's *Savage War of Peace*. However, the lack of primary sources is a significant weakness. Although it effectively summarizes many well-known themes in counterinsurgency, it does not add much new to the current situation in Iraq or the so-called Global War on Terror. The last chapter, which discusses recommended strategies for fighting the current global insurgency, does not tie in well with the first half of book discussing institutional cultural resistance to changing doctrine. More of the book should have been dedicated to those successes and better tied in with today's current situation.

Ironically, given the topic of the first part of the book, LTC Cassidy employs that conventional and fairly typical style of writing one sees routinely within the U.S. Army and the other U.S. services. The bottom line is upfront and the writing is spare and efficient; which is to say, the book is well-written and easy to read.

Given that the book is a survey of established publications, it is well footnoted with a strong bibliography. However, the book lacks an index. LTC Cassidy's book is very detailed and relatively complex, intertwining several different periods of history, very different cultures, and counterinsurgency experiences. An index would help a reader navigate his way back and forth through this study.

The flow of the book is disrupted by two things. The initial focus is on the Russian experience when discussing military cultures but switches over to a discussion of the French military when discussing successful strategies in prosecuting a counterinsurgency. The book would have been stronger by either staying with successful Russian experiences or studying French military culture. The Russians had significant success in directing partisan operations against the German Wehrmacht. Perhaps LTC Cassidy could have explored how they applied their success in partisan warfare throughout World War II to operations in both Afghanistan and Chechnya. Extensive colonial experiences and the military setbacks in the twentieth century shaped French counterinsurgency methods both in Vietnam and Algeria. The French Army had some notable counterinsurgency successes. For example, Field Marshal Lyautey of France directed an extremely successful counterinsurgency operation in Morocco.

A brief section on measures of effectiveness for judging counterinsurgency success appears to be inserted almost as an afterthought towards the end of the book. This section should have been placed as an introduction to the chapter on past counterinsurgency successes.

Equipped with a strong bibliography, this book is a good introduction to counterinsurgency for the general reader. However, those seeking an original, scholarly work, should read Robert B. Asprey's *War in the Shadows*, which remains unsurpassed in this field of literature and is still applicable to today's circumstances.

Matthew Levitt. *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 334 pages. \$26.00 Hardcover. ISBN: 0300110537

Reviewed by **Lawrence Rubin**
University of California,
Los Angeles, California, USA

Hamas' sweeping electoral victory in January 2006 may have raised more questions than it answered. While the majority of Palestinian society voted that they were tired of Fatah's corruption and cronyism, the election results raised a number of larger questions about Hamas: Is Hamas primarily a nationalist movement that merely uses pan-Islamic symbols or will it seek to impose Islamic law on Palestine? Is Hamas' electoral success another step in the growing trend of Islamic political activism? What type of peace, if any, will Hamas agree to make with Israel? No longer an opposition force, Hamas must now address these issues and define itself within the recently transformed Palestinian political scene.

Similar to the post-election punditry in the wake of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's electoral triumph, many asked how and why Hamas was so successful. But what puzzles Matthew Levitt in *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Jihad* is the peculiarity of Hamas' position: how does a militant Islamic movement in a relatively secular and war-torn society maintain and expand support? Levitt seeks to explain how Hamas recruits and mobilizes its supporters, as well as finances its terrorist and social welfare activities.

Recent studies on Hamas have focused much more on its ideological and political development. For instance, Ziad Abu-Amr's *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Cambridge University Press, 1994) studied the evolution of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza. Khaled Hroub's *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000) concentrated more on the development, strategy and tactics of Hamas. Finally, Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela's *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (Columbia University Press, 2000) examined Hamas as a social and political movement and focused on its strategic decision-making methods based on cost-benefit calculations.

Despite these previous contributions that have helped further our understanding of this Islamist group, Matthew Levitt's timely and well-documented book, *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Jihad*, makes an important contribution from a different perspective. Levitt, a former FBI analyst now working at the Treasury Department, has the policy community in mind when he argues that Hamas cannot be seen as an organization with disparate wings; rather, it should be seen as a unitary organization. Furthermore, his book makes a clear and consistent statement that there is much overlap between Hamas' charitable, political, and terrorist activities.

Levitt meticulously details the multiple roles that political, religious, and military leaders play, and he demonstrates how charitable social welfare organizations indirectly and directly support terrorism by funding Hamas. Levitt also effectively describes how Hamas operates by dividing the book into chapters dealing with political leadership, the financing of activities, recruitment, mobilization, and foreign funding of Hamas. This description gives readers a sense of how money is channeled, who makes decisions, and how this group successfully expands and retains support.

Levitt concludes by urging policy makers to keep up counter-terrorism efforts and continue weakening Hamas by eliminating its ability to garner support through its *dawa* [**literally ‘call’, or outreach**] and social welfare activities. As Levitt suggests, the establishment of an international fund could replace Hamas’ role as the provider of social welfare services for poor and needy Palestinians.

The strength of this well-researched book lies in its documentation. Levitt has compiled an impressive amount of primary sources to buttress his claims: declassified documents from the CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Canadian Secret Intelligence Service, and Palestinian intelligence documents seized by Israeli security. The book also includes interviews with members of numerous intelligence agencies as well as diplomats and policymakers from Europe, the Middle East and the United States. Levitt’s ability to cite numerous sources reinforces the credibility of his claims.

While the book’s strengths lie largely in its contribution to qualitative studies on terrorist organizations, there are also a number of areas the book could have further explored to improve the theoretical and conceptual depth of this important subject. To begin, the book’s motivation for publication is to challenge the assertion that Hamas has separate and distinct wings. However, this reviewer is not convinced that the counter-argument that Levitt attempts to refute is really a widely held belief. Levitt’s support for this counter-argument is that “*some analysts* draw a distinction between its military political and social wings and overemphasize the good works they [Hamas] do” (p. 3). In addition to citing the French government’s reticence to ban a certain charitable organization because of its contribution to Hamas’ social welfare work (p. 160), Levitt criticizes journalists, academics, and policymakers who subscribe to the myth that Hamas charity is disconnected from Hamas terror by arguing that “social activity shouldn’t merit Hamas’ upgrade from terrorist organization to militant” (p. 230). Yet few influential members of the policymaking community and academia would argue that these wings are entirely separate.

What Levitt seems to be implying is that Hamas should not be excused for its terrorist activities or granted the status of a “militant organization” because of its charitable work. In Levitt’s strongest chapter of the book, Chapter Two, he provides convincing evidence for links between the political and military wings of Hamas in order to debunk the myth that there are, so to speak, good and bad wings within Hamas. Indeed, it is plausible that Levitt is reacting to critics of Israel’s targeted assassinations of top Hamas leaders, such as Abdel Aziz Al-Rantassi and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin during Intifada Al-Aqsa. Mr. Levitt wishes to warn the policy community that a fine line does not even exist in Hamas’ social welfare, political, and terrorist activities, and this should inform how one deals with this group.

From an academic perspective, the book provides a substantive base for more theoretical and conceptual debates about violent social and political movements that transition to politics. While Levitt appropriately mentions Hamas’ use of the Hizballahi model of political participation, violence, and social welfare (p. 246–248), this reference is, unfortunately, the book’s only discussion of this fascinating phenomenon. A deeper and more extensive discussion might have contextualized these important political actors and social forces. Moreover, by setting the book within a more developed academic framework, it would have been possible to draw parallels and make much needed comparisons with Islamist parties in other countries or even with non-Muslim groups that have renounced violence and entered into the political process, such as the IRA. These comparisons would have

provided a new perspective and would have strengthened policy recommendations that might follow from the analysis.

Levitt has made an important contribution by collecting and documenting a vast amount of information exposing a link between Hamas' financial operations, political activities, use of violence, and social welfare work. This book highlights a growing trend of counter-terrorism efforts since 9/11 which aim to disrupt the financial support networks. While Levitt seems to target the policy community, the book is an important read for academics and policymakers to better understand how Hamas operates. For those working on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Palestinian politics, and Terrorism Studies, it is an essential resource and reference.