

Book Reviews

Brynjar Lia (2005) *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions*. London and New York. Routledge. Contemporary Security Series. 259 pages. \$37.95. ISBN 0714682381.

Reviewed by **Dipak K. Gupta**
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Prediction is a hazardous job, particularly when it comes to the future. So goes a popular wisdom told in a jest. Yet, author Brynjar Lia navigates through this intellectual minefield with aplomb and produces a book, which is by far one of the best works on terrorism this reviewer has read in a while. My enthusiasm for this book rests heavily on the clarity of Lia's arguments that makes this book so attractive.

Lia begins his arguments with two diagrams (p. 6 and p. 8) which neatly summarize his subsequent arguments. Figure 1 presents the argument that global political, economic, demographic, ideological, and technological changes create the structural and psychological environment within which terrorism is produced. The second diagram (Figure 1.2) elaborates this basic argument by further delineating these four factors. By drawing upon Samuel Huntington's description of the current global political system as Uni-/multi-polar, where a strong hegemon (the USA) is surrounded by growing regional powers, Lia attempts to understand the international political forces that are fueling the fires of hatred. This overall trend is being further complicated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the creation of new nation-states and increasing ranks of failed states. The conflicts generated by these changing political realities are causing the needs for intervention by the hegemonic and other regional powers. These interventions, through military might or through peacekeeping operations are creating their own dynamics for the resurgence of terrorist threats. Within this caldron of conflicting forces, the non-governmental organizations are playing an ever important role.

For Lia the economic structural factors influencing the global outcome of terrorism consist of economic inequities (both among and within nations); the conflict and collusion between business interest of transnational corporations and political impotency of national governments; the influence of organized crime providing an ominous nexus with terrorist organizations; and the world's dependence on the oil flow from some of the most volatile regions of the world.

The demographic factors that are contributing to the trends of global terrorism include population growth and migration. Rapid growth rates of population are accompanied by a pyramidal distribution with a very large proportion of young men and women. This emerging cohort represents not only an insatiable demand on resources, particularly in the poorer parts of the world and among the migrant minority population in the affluent West, but also supplies the bulk of the foot soldiers of political radicalism. As a result, migration is proving to be another incendiary factor affecting the future trends of terrorism.

The physical factors of structural imbalances provide the fertile grounds on which forces of political radicalism are born. However, social conflict and terrorism cannot take their final shape without the “ideas” that propel an aggrieved community toward the path of violent confrontation. Among the various ideologies, Lia notes that religious and ethno-nationalism have accounted for nearly the half (45%) of all the conflicts during the period 1968–2004 (p. 161). In this context he discusses the future trends of Islamic extremism and the resurgence of the new left.

Finally, Lia points out the impact of changing technology on the future global trends in terrorism. For this he considers the technologies of communication, creation of new weapons as well as new methods of counter-terrorism. The Internet has truly revolutionized the world of terrorism by providing an incredible weapon for the spread of ideas across the globe. It has also opened up and is opening up ever new areas concern.

Systematic analyses of the structural and ideological trends bring Lia to the well-reasoned yet unsurprising conclusion that “globalisation in the sense of increased interconnectedness, interdependence and deterritorialisation is set to continue. The implications of this for terrorism are likely to be sustained, if not higher, levels of transnational terrorism” (sic. p. 188).

If there is one weakness of Lia’s arguments, it is the preponderant emphasis that he accords to the structural factors. It is true that he does point out the importance of socio-psychological factors in generating terrorism. However, he immediately downplays their importance by noting that “Extremist violent ideologies do not cause terrorism by themselves, even if they are powerful instruments in the hands of eloquent leaders in propelling people toward terrorist actions. . . . The popularity of violent ideologies in some countries and their near absence in others is mostly rooted in structural societal factors.” (p. 159) If structural factors were *mostly* responsible for generating terrorism and violent conflicts, how do we account for the activities of the Christian Identity movement in the US, the recent bombings by homegrown Islamic terrorists in the UK and Spain, the attacks of the Muslim radicals in the Netherlands? From my perspective, the socio-psychological factors are at least equally important in explaining the future trends in global terrorism. I would argue that while the structural factors provide the necessary condition, the psychological factors constitute the sufficient condition for collective movements. This criticism, however, is a matter of emphasis and, as such, takes nothing away from a worthwhile project.

Paul Gilbert. *New Terror, New Wars*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003. 151 pages. \$24.95. ISBN 0-87840-345-0.

Reviewed by LCDR **Youssef Aboul-Enein**
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University of Hull professor Paul Gilbert has written extensively on the philosophical aspects of conflict. In this slim volume, he delves into old and widely accepted forms of behavior in warfare between nation states and attempts to redefine the concepts of self-defense, just war and proportionality in war to the current conflict of

transnational terrorism. Readers will contemplate a myriad of complex issues such as the blurring of a clear end-state in war. A war for national borders has a clear end-state or objective, but a war to deliver justice has no clear limits. Islamist militants seek retribution of perceived injustices to Islam perpetrated by the United States and her allies, the allies seek retribution for the terrorist acts committed by Islamist militants. Getting above the cycle of a bipolar world that Bin Laden craves will be consistent challenge in this long war. Another complexity is the reality that Islamist militants and other terrorists must be preempted by policing methods rather than engaged in combat. Hull's book is designed to bring out hard questions, such as will the military assume more police powers in western democracies?

Gilbert continues with an interesting dialogue on the goals of Islamist militants. He postulates the objective is the establishment of a Pan-Islamic super-state that brings all Muslims under a single government. This means in its ultimate expression, jihadists are in a conflict against different nationalisms (Egyptian, Moroccan, Algerian, Kuwaiti, Qatari, the list goes on). The book's ending chapters explore an ultimate goal of war for western democracies, which is the restoration of peace. This necessitates a new look on redefinition of such tools as amnesty, recognizing the unequal struggles between ethnic groups (such as recognizing the Serbs inherited the bulk of arms in the 1990s Balkans War). If you enjoy reading theoretical discussions on the socio-political aspects of conflict in the 21st century, you will enjoy Gilbert's book. Also recommended is Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen's new book, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006) a psycho-social exploration that conflict is sustained by the illusion of a unique identity. Another recommended book that explores as well as compares the psychological appeal of fascism and democracy is Israel Charny's book *Fascism and Democracy in the Human Mind*, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2006). [*Sen and Charney are both reviewed below, ed.*]

Mia Bloom. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 251 pp. \$24.95. ISBN 0-231-13320-0.

Reviewed by **Jeffrey Kaplan**
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Mia Bloom's *Dying to Kill* is a welcome addition to the literature of suicide terrorism. Since Christoph Reuter's journalistic *My Life is a Weapon: The Modern History of Suicide Bombing* appeared in 2002, there have been several fine works on the subject. Of these, none approach the depth and passion of Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg's study of Palestinian suicide terror, *The Road to Martyr's Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (Oxford 2005). If a reader were to read only one volume on this topic, the Oliver and Steinberg volume would be the one to seek out. *Dying to Kill* however, has much to offer and would be a more useful introductory volume than Robert Pape's better known and more theoretical *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (Random House 2005) or Ami Pedhazur's *The Root Causes of Suicide terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom* (Routledge 2005).

Bloom focuses her study on three primary cases: the Palestinian organizations utilizing suicide terror, the LTTE and other Sri Lankan organizations that have used

suicide terrorism, and the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) in Turkey who also briefly utilized the tactic. Surrounding these case studies are an introductory historical chapter and several theoretical/analytical chapters.

The historical chapter serves a dual purpose. First, it serves as an introduction which provides a preliminary glimpse of Bloom's theoretical take on suicide bombing. At the same time, the chapter pays homage to the foundational impact of David Rapoport's writing on the importance of the ancient cases of terrorism for our understanding of terror in the contemporary world. We are thus reintroduced to the Sicarri, the Assassins and the Thugs, as well as to the later case of the Japanese kamikaze pilots of WWII.

Bloom's theoretical approach is most concisely offered in the conclusion of *Dying to Kill*:

If suicide bombing has two main purposes—directed against the enemy and used for organizational purposes—then we can disaggregate the motivations and the goals according to theories of political science. Suicide terror as “coercive bargaining” is directed at the enemy to coerce them to leave the homeland territory; there is a phenomenon of outbidding directed toward the civilian population who sponsor, join, support or “vote” for these organizations. The objectives of suicide bombing are thus multiple and may reinforce or undercut each other depending on specific conditions of each case. The goals are directed against the international opponent (get out of the “homeland”), against the domestic rivals (to achieve dominance), against local collaborators (who might also be a source of political rivalry) and/or against a negotiated settlement to which they might be a party (spoil the peace). [191]

The case studies offered by the author tend to bear out these observations. The Palestinian case [chapter 2] is most instructive of a situation where the dearth of hope and omnipresence of apparently intractable injustices—the Israeli enemy without and the impotence and corruption of the Palestinian authority within—have created a climate conducive to suicide terror in which the cult of the *shahid* (martyr for the faith) has come to flourish. In such a climate, organizations such as the religious Hamas movement, the secular al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (a wing of the Fatah Movement), and even the Marxist ghost from a simpler time, the Marxist PFLP (Peoples' Front for the Liberation of Palestine), engage in suicide terror in an effort to ‘outbid’ each other for popular support.

The chapter on Palestinian suicide terror is Bloom's strongest, and her approach is much reminiscent of that of the late Ehud Sprinzak—to whose memory the volume is dedicated—in that it presents a thorough but concise picture of a complicated political landscape without losing sight of the essentially religious character of the players. Here, Bloom makes some telling observations. She notes for instance that of the some 225 suicide attacks that have occurred between 1993 and the time she completed her manuscript, none were apparently keyed toward blocking or facilitating either the peace process or on impacting Israeli politics. Rather, the attacks were aimed at internal Palestinian political rivalry. [34] Most tellingly, Bloom notes that whenever the Palestinian organizations engaging in suicide terror have offered a truce or cease fire, the Israeli response has invariably come in the form of a targeted assassination at the leadership or cadre level, thus provoking another round of

revenge suicide attacks within Israel. This in turn brings about yet more Israeli repression of Palestinians, and of course, more targeted assassinations. [37–39] The cycle seems endless.

The Sri Lankan case is less well known than the Palestinian, and so inevitably the author's discussion of it appears less nuanced to the average reader. Tamil names do not roll off the English speaking tongue quite as felicitously as those of the more familiar Palestinian figures or the more monosyllabic Kurds of the PKK case. Indeed, until the 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a female Tamil suicide bomber, the Tamil case was known to only a handful of specialists. But the Gandhi assassination in retrospect followed the example of the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon and presaged the wave of suicide terrorism (in Bloom's terms, the 'contagion effect' of suicide terrorism)—as well as the particular effectiveness of women in the role of suicide bombers—that would inspire the adoption of the tactic in the Islamic world and beyond only a few short years later. [ch. 6]

Bloom does a reasonably good job of disaggregating the numerous actors in the Sri Lankan conflict, noting the fact that religion plays little part in the battle beyond the role of Hinduism as an ethnic marker. This in itself is significant, given the popular association of suicide terrorism with Islam. Suicide terror in this case played an important role in the emergence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) as the leading Tamil terror organization, as well as in building the mystique surrounding the LTTE's charismatic leader Villupilai Prabhakaran. In the Sri Lankan case however, like that of the Kurdish PKK detailed in chapter 5, the Sri Lankan public has not embraced suicide terror as a legitimate tactic when that terror targets or victimizes civilians. This lack of resonance in the author's view is directly attributable to the process of peaceful reconciliation which was eventually adopted by the Sri Lankan government. The absence of hope in the Palestinian case is therefore in direct contrast to the cases of Sri Lanka and Turkey, and thus the prevalence of suicide bombing as a tactic, and thus too the over abundance of candidates for martyrdom in Palestine as opposed to Sri Lanka or Turkey.

Bloom follows these case studies with two theoretical chapters dealing with what she calls the contagion effect of suicide terror [ch. 6] and the role of women in suicide terrorism [ch. 7]. The contagion effect refers to the obvious fact that other terrorist movements around the globe comprise a key audience for terrorist acts. Tactics are, and have always been fungible, and suicide terror is no exception. If suicide terror worked for the Tamils and the Lebanese Shi'ites before them, and for a time for the Kurds, why should it be any less effective for the Palestinians or the Chechens? The point is well taken, but the chapter tends to be overdrawn and accepts rather uncritically Claire Sterling's even more overblown Cold War vision of a dreaded 'terrorist international', controlled from Moscow and locked in an existential struggle with the West [120–121] (see Sterling, *The Terror Network*, 1981, for chapter and verse).

This chapter is points to the one weakness of *Dying to Kill*; the author's occasional uncritical acceptance of sources at face value if those sources further her narrative. Several examples may be posited, but one of the more egregious concerns the alleged role of al-Quada in financing the Chechen attack on a school in Beslan in September 2004:

...Allegations of the direct financial involvement of Bin Laden continue even after the war on terror has allegedly disrupted the financial links

between al Quada and its franchises. One such example is the allegation that al Quada bankrolled the attack in Beslan. "President Putin argues that the tactics used by the terrorists are those of al Quada, and therefore the funding must come from it too." (quoting a newspaper report) Yet economic connections together with the ideological influences and tactical training are all inextricably linked to form a contagion and diffusion of suicide terror.

Perhaps so, but two 'allegations' in two sentences—and the use of President Putin's rather specious logic as a form of evidence—would seem a weak grounding upon which to further the contagion thesis.

Be this as it may, the author's discussion of women and suicide terrorism in the chapter titled "Feminism, Rape and War: Engendering Suicide Terror?" is insightful and wonderfully nuanced. Women have increasingly become targets in war, revolution or terrorist campaigns. Rape has become so endemic in local and regional conflicts that it has been recognized for the first time as a war crime and prosecutions of individuals from former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have made international headlines. Bloom notes this trend, and demonstrates how rape and other forms of sexual abuse have contributed to the emergence of female suicide bombers in Sri Lanka, Chechnya and Palestine. Contributing too are issues stemming from a loss of hope and an all-consuming desire for revenge following the deaths of husbands, brothers and sons. Bloom notes as well the importance of gender status issues in the emergence of female suicide bombers—women who strike not out of revenge, but rather because they can and, despite culturally grounded gender inequalities—who feel that they should be as willing as men to make the ultimate sacrifice for their people and their cause.

Dying to Kill concludes with a speculative chapter dealing with the possibility of the emergence of suicide terrorism in the United States. Many pages of this narrative focus on a scathing analysis of the War in Iraq and the administration which plunged the nation into the conflict. It would be hard to argue with the author's conclusions, but a more judicious editor might have asked the author to focus more tightly on the topic at hand (analysis of ongoing conflicts have a rather short shelf life in academic texts). Nonetheless, Bloom's argument that the lack of a terrorist infrastructure to support suicide terrorism, combined with the increasing difficulty of acquiring the materials for effective bomb making (many will dispute the author's latter point—even in post 9/11 America, everything is for sale at the right price with few questions asked) make a sustained campaign of suicide terror extremely unlikely on these shores.

Altogether, Mia Bloom's *Dying to Kill* is a fine introduction to the topic and is highly recommended.

Michael Barkun. *A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America*. University of California Press, 2003. xii + 243 pages. \$24.95 cloth.

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If Michael Barkun had endeavored only to document and catalogue wild and untamed strands of modern American conspiracy belief, this book would have still

been a massive and worthy undertaking. Yet Barkun structures the book not with his impressive and highly readable intellectual histories of various conspiracy beliefs and their relationships with one another, but with a basic epistemological challenge: How do we really know what is true? Conspiracy theories are comfortably dismissed as “crazy talk,” out of touch with reality. Yet the bigger, more absurd a conspiracy is, the more it can start to undermine agreement on what we call real.

This inherent skepticism about the “given truths” of the world, for Barkun, is what fundamentally connects conspiracists to millenarian apocalypticists. The sense that one small, persecuted group has access to the true picture of the world while others are blinded by lies is a perception straight out of the Book of Revelation. These groups are set apart and united by what Barkun terms “stigmatized knowledge.” “[S]tigmatization itself is taken to be evidence of the truth – for why else would a belief be stigmatized if not to suppress the truth? Hence stigmatization, instead of making a truth claim appear problematic, is seen to give it credibility, by implying that some malign forces conspired to prevent its becoming known” (p. 28). A “fact-fiction reversal” tends to be the logical outcome of such a validation, whereby information purported to be fact by the usual arbiters of knowledge – academics, scientists, and most of all government agencies and the media – is seen as part of the veil of lies wielded by the conspiracy.

What does separate the millenarianism of the conspiracy worldview from that of religious apocalypticism is its improvisational nature. Rather than having a traditional set of concerns extrapolated from scripture, conspiracism unearths novel plots everywhere by, variously, FEMA, underground alien reptiles, the Trilateral Commission, and, of course, Jews. While Barkun devotes two chapters to New World Order conspiracies and four distinct chapters on UFO claims, all of the conspiracists’ ideas interconnect at multiple points, often combining and recombining into various “superconspiracies.” (An excellent index helps to identify where various ideas and themes intersect, and extensive endnotes explicate Barkun’s sources without interrupting the narrative flow of the book.) For believers, as the conspiracies grow larger, so to is the evidence increasingly right in front of your eyes if you know where (and how) to look for it. Moreover, as the power of the conspiracy grows, those who see through it perceive themselves society’s only hope of salvation. Ultimately, Barkun concludes, conspiracism “is, first and foremost, an explanation of politics” (p. 178) – an observation also applicable to millennialism that arguably resonates strongly with American political culture today. *Culture of Conspiracy* is both a vivid history and wary explanation of why the strategy of obfuscating the facts of the world with unfalsifiable rhetoric and fearsome paranoia has always existed to some degree at both the fringes and the center of our nation’s popular thought.

Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, (eds.). *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 320 pp; \$26.95. ISBN: 0878403477

Reviewed by **George Michael**
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In the aftermath of September 11, numerous strategies have been advanced by academics, blue ribbon panels, and government agencies to confront the threat from the

“new terrorism.” Editors Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes assemble an array of experts in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* to address the various aspects of this challenge. In doing so, they present a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing policy in this area. The major components necessary to develop a grand strategy are reviewed and analyzed.

Audrey Kurth Cronin, a terrorism specialist for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, searches for the current sources of contemporary terrorism by examining four levels of analysis—the individual, the organization, the state, and the international system. At the level of the individual, Cronin concurs with recent research that suggests that most terrorists do not exhibit demonstrable psychopathologies. However, she argues that it is important to distinguish between the psychological motivations for the potential “pool”, or recruits, and the leaders of terrorist organizations insofar as the two segments are likely to be driven by different factors. At the level of the organization, Cronin points out that terrorism is fundamentally a group activity, and as such, cannot properly be understood without reference to such variables as shared ideological commitment, group identity, peer pressure, indoctrination, and group reinforcement. The third level takes into account the role of the state. For many years, the U.S. government assumed that state sponsorship was crucial for the maintenance of a serious terrorist entity. In that vein, Claire Sterling’s classic study, *The Terrorist Network*, illustrated the role of the Soviet Union in enabling various national liberation and leftist terrorist organizations around the world. The trend of state sponsorship accelerated after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as the new Islamic Republic entered into the international terrorism business by supporting Hezbollah and other related terrorist groups. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the moderation (until recently) of the Islamic Republic reversed this trend. Be that as it may, the past decade has demonstrated that certain terrorist groups—e.g., al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo—could inflict lethal attacks without state sponsorship. Finally, the fourth level of analysis, the international system considers broad trends such as Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” which presaged that global conflict in the twenty-first century would be animated by differences in culture. Indeed, Huntington’s prediction that Islam and the West were on a collision course appears prescient in the aftermath of 9/11. Also important is the historical process of globalization, which influences the international context within which terrorism operates.

David C. Rapoport, emeritus professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) examines broad cycles in the history of terrorism over the past 125 years. As he sees it, a certain *Zeitgeist* defines each major wave of modern terrorism. According to Rapoport, each wave has a life cycle of about one generation and employs its own unique tactics to effect its goals and language to justify its ideological principles. The first wave commenced in Russia during the late 1880s and later appeared in Western Europe, and the Balkans. This “Anarchist wave” was the first real global terrorist experience. The second wave appeared in the 1920s and was characterized by anti-colonialism. The Treaty of Versailles raised the aspirations for self-determination among people living under the yoke of colonialism. World War II accelerated this trend, as more and more erstwhile colonial subjects attained their independence. The third wave was spearheaded by the “New Left”, which criticized “the establishment” in the West for not living up to its democratic ideals. Radicals in the West, such as the Weather Underground, the Red Army Factions, and the Red Brigades drew inspiration from and sought to

make common cause with various liberation movements in the Third World including the Viet Cong and the PLO. Rapoport marks the year 1979 as the genesis of the fourth wave. In that year, three important events occurred—i.e., the Iranian Revolution, the start of a new Islamic century, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. What the first three waves all shared in common was that they were all inspired by secular ideologies that generally called for greater democracy, self-determination, and social justice. By contrast, the fourth wave informed by militant Islam, marks a departure from this pattern. In this sense, the fourth wave is anti-democratic in that it rejects secularism and in its stead, explicitly calls for elements of a theocracy including the establishment of the *Sharia*, or Islamic law. The tactic of suicide terrorism is the major innovation of the fourth wave. Rapoport cautions that Islamic terrorism wave may outlast the previous waves insofar as it is inspired by religion, which has proven to be far more durable than secular ideologies.

Martha Crenshaw, professor of government at Wesleyan University, evaluates the American strategy of combating terrorism. As she explains, in the main, strategy is about making the available means produce the desired ends. Toward this goal, she recommends a balanced approach that would identify the most serious threats and the appropriate methods to counter them. One factor that militated against the development of an effective counterterrorist grand strategy is the tendency for democratic governments to ignore issues until they reach a certain level of criticality. Prior to 9/11, too many other issues and pressing problems had the effect of keeping terrorism in the “realm of the ordinary.” However, after 9/11, terrorism could no longer be given short shrift and a comprehensive strategy was in order. Toward this end, the Bush administration announced its *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* in September 2002, which was followed by the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in February 2003. Together, these two documents called for strong measures including pre-emption, unilateralism, and regime change for those countries that posed a potential threat. Crenshaw argues that support from other nations is indispensable for U.S. counterterrorist efforts.

Michael Sheehan looks at the role of diplomacy in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Sheehan, the deputy commissioner for counterterrorism of the New York City Police Department, argues for the use of all available foreign policy instruments to influence critical countries to cooperate with the United States. He advocates an approach that would strip away the terrorists’ political agenda and focus on their criminal acts. Although a focus on “root causes” might initially sound more humane and principled, it could also prove fruitless as evidenced by the fact that many of al Qaeda’s leaders come from relatively wealthy Persian Gulf countries that lack endemic poverty. Globalization has spurred the migrations of people across national borders. This trend has resulted in numerous diasporic enclaves in other countries that often support their co-ethnics involved in terrorism in their home countries. Therefore, as Sheehan points out, foreign governments have a vested interest in cooperating with the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts in that they often face the same terrorist threats. To further this cooperation, the U.S. government can provide financial, security, and military aid. Sheehan argues that the State Department is best suited to coordinate these efforts insofar as it is in its traditional purview to interface with foreign governments.

Paul Pillar points out the crucial role of intelligence in the campaign against terrorism. As an intelligence analyst with broad experience in the CIA, Pillar delineates the proper functions of the U.S. counterterrorist intelligence apparatus. Intelligence,

as Pillar sees it, is the linchpin of an effective counterterrorist strategy insofar as it provides information on groups, cells, and individuals that seek to inflict harm the United States. In order to effectively confront the transnational nature of the new terrorist threat, Pillar believes that it is important to piece together disparate information collected from a wide variety of sources—human, technical, and open source—from many different places, though this could require that the United States deal on occasion with regimes and individuals with “blood stained pasts.” Pillar opines that reliance on field operations officers fluent in the language and steeped in the foreign culture, is impractical and over romanticized. At the end of the day, Pillar advises that American policymakers must have an appreciation for what intelligence assets can and cannot accomplish in order to develop a sensible counterterrorism strategy.

Lindsay Clutterbuck, a detective chief inspector in the Specialist Operations Department of the Metropolitan Police, London, reviews the two conceptual models of combating terrorism—i.e., “the criminal justice model” and the “war model.” He calls for an approach that would integrate both models, arguing that they are not mutually exclusive, but rather, two ends of a continuum to be employed alternatively under appropriate conditions. The best strategy would integrate both approaches as part of a holistic strategy. Inasmuch as the threat from terrorism is constantly changing, Clutterbuck recommends a flexible approach drawing upon both law enforcement techniques and the military force would be most effective.

Timothy D. Hoyt, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College, examines the feasibility of the military approach to combating terrorism. As he observes, the tragic events of 9/11 occasioned a new paradigm that allows for the increased use of U.S. military power to confront international terrorism. However, he counsels that the use of military force must be carefully correlated with political objectives if this strategy is to be successful. As he points out, traditionally, American strategic culture views war as a last resort, but once employed, it should be waged with maximum force in order to be won quickly and exact maximalist objectives (e.g., unconditional surrender and regime change). One serious obstacle when targeting terrorists is that they usually lack a center of gravity. State sponsors and those that harbor terrorists could be targeted, but “new terrorist” networks that are amorphous and decentralized are difficult to target. In order to meet this challenge, Hoyt advocated “jointness” at two levels—first, increased interagency cooperation in the U.S. government that would harness all tools of national power to eliminate al Qaeda and its affiliates and second, increased cooperation between the U.S. and its coalition partners.

Adam Roberts, a professor of international relations at Oxford University, reviews the legal aspects regarding international conflict and their implications for the current war on terrorism. The war on terror raises issues involving the right to resort to the use of force (*jus ad bellum*) and the appropriate use of force in war (*jus in bello*). Related to this is proportionality that sets out the criteria for limits in the prosecution of war. As Roberts observes, this principle is in conflict with current U.S. military doctrine, which favors the overwhelming use of force to achieve victory quickly with a minimal amount of U.S. casualties. Another thorny issue is the proper treatment of captured enemy combatants. Inasmuch as Islamic terrorists act independently of any state, should they be granted prisoner or war status and its attendant legal protections? Roberts avers that existing international law, however imperfect it may be, should continue to guide policy regarding the proper conduct in the war on terror.

Carnes Lord, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, appraises the application of psychological-political instruments. He points out that the U.S. government dismantled much of its public diplomacy apparatus after the end of the Cold War. Whereas, United States Information Agency (USIA) programs such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe reached many listeners in Eastern Europe, similar programs have not made many inroads in the Middle East. Lord calls for a three part strategy that includes first, a war of ideas that discredits Islamism; second, a political-legal approach that encourages foreign governments to crack down on the public advocacy of radical Islam and the organizations that espouse it; and third, a political-institutional approach that suppresses Pakistani madrassas that can serve as incubators for future jihadists.

Patrick M. Cronin, an assistant administrator for policy and program coordination of the U.S. Agency for International Development, explains the efficacy of foreign aid and how it can be used to gain cooperation of foreign countries in the war on terrorism. Assuming no significant increases in foreign aid, Cronin points out that the U.S. government must make painful and calculated choices that give priority to its foreign policy agenda in which combating terrorism looms large. Observing that foreign aid is an integral part of national strategy, Cronin argues for a systematic approach that would reward those countries that demonstrate commitment to promoting economic growth, political reform, and social development. Furthermore, assistance should be granted to restore stability in fragile and failed states. Finally, assistance can be used to help strengthen institutions that can deliver social services and create political and economic opportunities for its citizens, and in doing so, “drain the swamps” of frustration out of which terrorists emerge.

Daniel Gouré, the vice president of the Lexington Institute (a non-profit public policy research organization), expounds on the role of homeland security in the larger grand strategy. He identifies three operational foci for homeland security. First, barrier creation and transportation security must be strengthened, yet not place an undue burden on international commerce. Second intrusion detection and response entails neutralizing terrorists and their supporters who have already entered the country. Finally, consequence management involves protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and preparing and responding to emergencies. At the end of the day, Gouré believes the only strategy that is likely to be effective in securing the homeland is one that emphasizes offensive action and even pre-emption. Through this aggressive approach, coupled with modest improvements in current programs designed to close obvious gaps, a high degree of security could be obtained.

Finally, Audrey Kurth Cronin synthesizes the various essays and offers her advice for developing a more effective and balanced strategy against terrorism. As numerous critics have observed, by declaring a war on “terrorism” the U.S. government has embarked on an open-ended campaign against a tactic that probably will never be fully eradicated. Cronin argues for a more focused response that explicitly targets al Qaeda and its associated groups insofar as they pose the most serious threat to the U.S. and its interests. An integrated strategy that makes best use of the instruments discussed including diplomacy, foreign aid, intelligence, law enforcement, and military force could be tied into an effective grand strategy. However, to meet this challenge the bureaucracy, characterized by a hierarchical structure, must be able to adapt and forge agile connections among its agencies so that it can combat the amorphous network of al Qaeda. Cronin cautions that an over-reliance on the

use of military force could be counterproductive, as evidenced by the war in Iraq, which has siphoned off resources that could be used against al Qaeda, alienated important allies in the counterterror coalition, and engendered renewed anti-Americanism in many parts of the world.

What makes this volume significant is its thoroughness and specificity in dealing with the various aspects of counterterrorism policy. Numerous experts bring their experience to bear on different aspects that are essential to the development of a grand strategy. The contributors draw in contemporary trends that impinge on contemporary terrorism, most notably the process of globalization and the networked quality of al Qaeda. The amorphous structure of al Qaeda has allowed it to adapt and survive despite tremendous opposition. To meet this challenge, the authors suggest a flexible approach that includes increased cooperation and coordination not only among U.S. government agencies, but also their counterparts in foreign countries as well as private entities including non-governmental organizations, interest groups, and civic organizations. Various features of contemporary organizational theory including decentralization, individual initiative, flat organizational structures, network connections, individual empowerment, and bottoms-up management could be employed to counter the threat of the new terrorism. There is also an appreciation of what Joseph S. Nye Jr. referred to as “soft power.” As the authors observe, the war on terror is in large part a contest to win over the hearts and minds of the people of the Islamic world and wean them away from the blandishments of the radical Islam. Therefore, as Audrey Cronin opines, an effective strategy must include an element of “positive power”—e.g., providing aid, reconstruction, demonstrating a commitment to democracy and freedom—as well as “negative power”—e.g., military and law enforcement measures. Most important of all, the authors argue for a comprehensive strategy, drawing upon the resources from many segments of society devoted to an achievable and well-articulated endgame is necessary to win the war on terror and secure the homeland. *Attacking Terrorism* succeeds in presenting the “big picture” of counterterrorism strategy to policymakers, scholars, and the general public.

Amartya Sen. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006. 224 pages. \$24.95. ISBN 0393060071.

Israel W. Charny. *Fascism and Democracy in the Human Mind: A Bridge between Mind and Society*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. 471 pages. \$49.95. ISBN 0803215509.

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Comprehending human conflicts occasionally requires going beyond tactics, strategy and the tools of warfare to delve deep into the human psycho-social factors that make fascism, Islamist militancy and the drive towards totalitarianism appealing. 1998 Noble Laureate Amartya Sen, writes a short book (186 pages) exploring how violence is sustained by the illusion of a unique identity. He ends by discussing the need for a clear-headed understanding of a basic human freedom. *Identity and*

Violence: The Illusion of Destiny opens by discussing how groups like Al-Qaeda, Sudanese Islamic militants, Serbs, Hutus and many more groups manipulate identity-based thinking to justify genocide, terrorism and murder. Yet today's human being is a complex series of competing identities based on citizenship, religious affiliation, race, profession, class, tastes in music and much more. What makes Saladin (perhaps one of the most important figures of Muslim history and one who is hailed by the likes of Saddam Hussein and militant jihadists) make room in his court for the Jewish philosopher Maimonides? Or in the 1590s, how could the Muslim Mughal Emperor Akbar insist that faith cannot have priority over reason? Is this the essence of what could be wrong with 21st century Muslim society?

Sen also discusses the problem of the colonized mind. Of course one cannot deny the impact colonialism has had in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. But while the western world has come to terms with the inappropriateness of colonial rule, those who have been victims of colonization have had mixed experiences. This colonial mindset, encourages needless hostility to global ideas, it has contributed to the distorted reading of history, and it has caused the growth of radicalism. Sen's book is for those not wanting easy answers to the problems of ideological radicalism. It puts forth new ways of looking and thinking about such problems. *Identity and Violence* forces readers to consider harnessing those elements of self-identity that can make a positive contribution to the community and society-at-large.

The next volume is Israel W. Charny's new book *Fascism and Democracy in the Human Mind: A Bridge between Mind and Society*. Charny, a practicing clinical psychologist, is the Editor-in-Chief of the *Encyclopedia of Genocide* and is Executive Director of the Institute of the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem. His 455 page book takes a very deep psychological look at both the democratic and fascist minds in terms of intimate relationships, social situations and finally global events. The book extracts the psycho-social reasons for the appeal of fascism, which includes the freedom not to make choices, as well as the freedom to be perpetually dependent on others to tell you what to read, think and do. Others seek refuge in totalitarianism because it defines who the model citizen is, and provides a false sense of security and certainly in an uncertain world.

Many Afghans welcomed the Taliban initially because above all they brought a semblance of law and order among decades of war and then fighting warlords. Their fanatical views were tolerated to a point and then their quest to change the multi-ethnic character of Afghans became intolerable. The book questions how are terrorists made? What would you do if caught up in the Holocaust, My Lai, or Rwanda? And what would you do if confronted with evil? Charny discusses how fascism initially is thrilling it gives a person identity and a sense of empowerment. His words could also be applied to the jihadist group that recruits suicide bombers. Readers are then taken to a detailed contrasting of seven characteristics of the fascist versus the democratic mind. Such contradictions include totality versus diversity, absolutism versus acceptance of uncertainty as well as creative tension. In the end Charny's analysis makes an appeal for the democratic way of thinking. Books like that of Amartya Sen and Israel Charny help begin to answer the question of what makes a terrorist.

Editor's Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is a Middle East Advisor at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is the author of a monograph on Zawahiri published by the U.S. Air Force and co-author of the monograph, Islamic Rulings on Warfare published by the Army War College.