

## RACIAL CONTEXTS AND WHITE INTERESTS: Beyond Black Threat and Racial Tolerance

Baodong Liu

The impact of racial context on white voters' support for black candidates in biracial elections has drawn considerable attention from students of racial politics. Two major theories—black threat and social interaction—use different geographic units and provide conflicting explanations. The present study seeks to contribute to the resolution of the controversy by empirically examining white crossover voting at both election unit and neighborhood levels. Twenty-nine mayoral and councilmanic district elections in New Orleans from 1977 to 1998 are investigated. The findings are not consistent with the hypotheses derived from black threat and social interaction theories. Rather than a reflection of racial tolerance or hostility, the changes in white crossover voting in different racial contexts may indicate a rational and strategic adjustment on the part of white voters when they face the prospect of black electoral success.

**Key words:** racial context; black threat; racial tolerance; strategic voting; crossover voting; white voting behavior.

### TWO COMPETING HYPOTHESES

Since the landmark Voting Rights Act effectively protected the right of African Americans to cast ballots, a research focus of the literature of racial politics has been on black electoral success (McClain and Garcia, 1993, pp. 247–279). Because black candidates often have to compete with white opponents

Baodong Liu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Stephens College, Box 2073, Columbia, MO 65215 (pliu@wc.stephens.edu)

An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 95th American Political Science Association Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1–3, 1999. Funding for this research was provided by the American Political Science Association, the Southwestern Political Science Association, and Stephens College. The author would like to thank Richard Engstrom, D. Stephen Voss, Christine L. Day, Charles Hadley, Susan Howell, Gary King, Robert Darcy, Andy Walker, Lu Yao, *Political Behavior's* editor, and the reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.

in attracting white voters' support in order to win elections, the willingness of whites to vote for black candidates has drawn considerable attention from both black office-seekers and students of racial politics (Bullock, 1985, pp. 185–208; Carsey, 1995, pp. 221–228; DeLorenzo, Kohfeld and Stein, 1997, pp. 120–133; Liu, 2001; Liu and Vanderleeuw, 1999; Perry, 1996; Reeves, 1997; Sonenshein, 1997; Voss and Lublin, 2001).

One of the variables that receives attention in explanations of white support, or the lack thereof, for black candidates is that of racial density. It has been reported that there is a negative relationship between the size of the black population in an area and white racial tolerance (Giles and Buckner, 1993, pp. 702–713; Glaser, 1994, pp. 21–41; Herring and Forbes, 1994, pp. 431–445). The theory used to explain this relationship focuses on whites' group interests and the relative threats posed by blacks in different contexts. According to this threat theory, different contexts affect white perceptions of how their group interests are threatened by blacks (Giles and Buckner, 1993; Giles and Hertz, 1994; Glaser, 1994; Key, 1949). A higher level of black population density may produce a higher level of white perception of black threat and, therefore, a lower level of white crossover voting.

One problem with the operationalization of this black threat theory is the unit of analysis. A white voter may live in a predominantly white precinct that belongs to a larger electoral district with a black majority. Under this circumstance, we may ask which level of context, precinct or electoral district, is more important in explaining white voting behavior? Many scholars who employ threat theory to study white voting behavior base their research on the basic ideas of V. O. Key's classic study of southern states in the 1940s. Key (1949) argued:

The hard core of the political South—and the backbone of southern political unity—is made up of those *counties and sections of the southern states* in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population. In these areas a real problem of politics, broadly considered, is the maintenance of control by a white minority. (p. 5, emphasis added)

It is clear that Key examined black threat at a relatively large unit of racial context: counties and sections of states. Most contemporary studies of black threat continue to examine the impact of black population densities at a county or city level (e.g., Herring and Forbes, 1994).

Another school of scholars, however, has paid more attention to smaller units of analysis. According to social context theory, context influences political behavior because population composition structures opportunities for social interaction (Huckfeldt, 1986). White voting behavior in general reflects the way that whites interact with the other racial group—blacks. The interac-

tion between whites and blacks can be better studied at a smaller unit (e.g., neighborhood or precinct). Contrary to the black threat thesis, the studies done in this context indicate that black density, at roughly the neighborhood level, has a positive impact on whites' crossover voting and racial attitudes (Carsey, 1995; DeLorenzo et al., 1997; Sadow, 1996; Voss, 1996).

In sum, based on the different levels of racial context, the threat thesis and social context thesis provide two different, if not opposite, hypotheses regarding the impact of racial context on white crossover voting. Whites may be expected to engage in a very low level of racial crossover voting in a black majority context according to the black threat theory, but a very high level of crossover voting according to the social context theory. There has been little previous research, if any, that empirically examines the effect of black density on white voting behavior at the level of both the election unit (e.g., citywide or in a council district) and the voting precinct. To test the two competing hypotheses, the present study examines the relative effects of these two racial contexts on white crossover voting as well as the direction of the relationship between black density and white crossover voting.

#### THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF RACIAL CONTEXTS ON WHITE CROSSOVER VOTING

Why is it important to know which racial context (election unit or neighborhood) has a larger effect on white crossover voting? White voters live in these two racial contexts simultaneously. Black density can be different at the two levels. White voters, for example, could live in a predominantly white neighborhood that is part of a larger black dominated electoral district. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) have stated, different contexts may have different "political contents" and carry their own "political implications" (pp. 10, 280–281).

Many of the academic debates about the effects of black density on white racial hostility have concerned the appropriate geographic level at which to expect these effects. Stephen Voss (1996), for example, discovered that black density, measured by the percentage of registered voters that was black at the parish level in Louisiana, was negatively related to white support for David Duke in Louisiana's urban areas in three Louisiana elections. Voss argued that his findings "cast doubt on the continuing usefulness of the racial-threat hypothesis" (p. 1168). In an earlier study, however, Giles and Buckner (1993) observed that black density, measured as "the percent black for the MSA [metropolitan statistical areas] and assigning that percentage to each parish constituting the MSA" (Also, see Giles and Buckner, 1996, p. 1175), was positively related to white support for Duke in Louisiana. While arguing that whites' perception of black threat is not "bounded by their parish," Giles and

Buckner suggest that a parish-based measurement of black density can “pick up the interparish dynamics within the MSAs” (Giles and Buckner, 1996, pp. 1175–1177).

The different level of aggregation is the major difference between the two studies. It is important to note, however, that the white voters in these studies lived in both contexts simultaneously. Each context might have its own political implications. If racial density can influence the white voters differently in the different contexts, then a critical issue becomes which context is more important. The answer can only be provided by comparing and testing the relative effects of black density in the two contexts at the same time.

Many analysts have noticed the importance of multilevel contextual analyses (Blalock, 1984; DiPrete and Forristal, 1994; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). Unfortunately, little research has concerned the relative effects of racial contexts on white crossover voting. As Huckfeldt and Sprague note, “very few studies are equipped to support such a comparison” (p. 260), as it is difficult to obtain two measures of contexts at a time. This study is designed to fill this gap. Furthermore, it will offer and test a white strategic voting model to explain the changes of white crossover voting in different racial contexts.

#### **THE WHITE STRATEGIC VOTING MODEL: BEYOND BLACK THREAT AND RACIAL TOLERANCE**

Built on the different assumptions, the black threat and racial tolerance hypotheses tend to view racial contexts as a factor that either enhances “assimilation” between groups or increases “conflict” between them (see Huckfeldt, 1986, pp. 13–24 for a discussion of these two opposite paradigms of contextual analyses). These dichotomous views of racial contexts may be misleading, however. They may miss an important third possibility: white strategic crossover voting due to the change in the black density at the election unit level.

A direct consequence of the racial composition of an election unit is that it may determine the likelihood of electing a white candidate in that unit. The greater the black density of an electoral district, the greater the electoral power of blacks in that district and the smaller the probability of electing a white candidate. When the black density of an electoral district increases to a level that electing a white candidate is less likely than electing a black candidate, whites may vote for the black candidate most favorable to them. This type of white crossover is a form of strategic voting because its goal is to protect white group interests and, at least, not cast a wasted vote. Indeed, voting for a white candidate who has no realistic chance to win may not be responsive to a perceived need to protect white interests. Voting for the most favorable black candidate who has a good chance to win may, in fact, be a

more efficacious way to protect white interests. By doing so, whites can at least reduce the chance of electing an unfavorable black candidate.

Thus, rather than a reflection of racial tolerance or hostility, the changes in white crossover voting in different racial contexts may indicate a rational and strategic adjustment on the part of white voters when they face the prospect of black electoral success. Comparatively speaking, the white strategic voting model suggests that white voters may be more pragmatic than is the interpretation provided by the traditional black threat hypothesis. Contrary to the black threat hypothesis, the white strategic voting model hypothesizes a positive relationship between black density and white crossover voting at the election unit level. As for the difference between the white strategic voting model and social context theory, the strategic model suggests that whites vote for the black candidate most favorable to them not because racial interactions in their neighborhood enhance their racial tolerance but to protect their group interests. More specifically, while the strategic hypothesis also posits a positive relationship between black density and white crossover voting, it suggests a positive relationship at the election unit level, rather than at the neighborhood level.

Black density is not, by itself, the only factor that may stimulate white strategic crossover. When there is a reasonable chance to elect a white candidate, the strategic voting model predicts that whites show a lower level of support for black candidates. In order to assess the strength of white candidates, white voters may use cues such as whether a white candidate is an incumbent (Llorens, Parsons and Perry, 1996) or whether a white candidate has made it to a runoff (Bullock, 1985). Therefore, hypotheses based on two measures of white candidates' strength can be stated as: the level of white crossover voting will be lower in elections with a white incumbent than in elections without a white incumbent; and the level of white crossover voting will be lower when a white candidate is in a runoff election than when a white candidate is in a primary election.

White strategic crossover voting, based on the protection of white group interests, can also be affected by the probability of finding a "not threatening" or "least threatening" black candidate. Previous studies suggest that whites do have two cues to aid in the choice of a black candidate: black incumbency status and the endorsement of a "white" newspaper (Reeves, 1997; Bullock, 1985). In particular, the newspaper endorsements of black candidates in biracial elections play a very important role because endorsements by a white-controlled newspaper may provide white voters with "important voting cues as to the candidates' qualifications and political acceptability" (Lieske, 1989, p. 154). Moreover, the importance of newspaper endorsement is that it may "legitimate or bestow group and institutional approval" on the candidates endorsed (Lieske, 1989, p. 153).

Finally, the relative presence of black candidates reflects black involvement in a biracial election (Vanderleeuw, 1990). The more black candidates there are in a biracial election, the greater the possibility that whites can find a favorable black candidate. The white strategic voting model, therefore, expects that the level of white crossover is positively related to the black percentage of candidates in biracial elections.

## DATA

This study examines white crossover voting in New Orleans municipal elections from 1977 to 1998. New Orleans provides an excellent setting in which to examine contextual effects of black density on white crossover voting. In the past decades, there has been an important change in the racial composition of the city. The relative size of the black population of New Orleans grew from 45% in 1970 to 55.3% in 1980 and 62.1% in 1990. At the same time, the black percentage of registered voters in New Orleans also grew from 30.8 in 1970 to 44.7 in 1980 and 56 in 1990.

This wide range in the racial composition of the city and the variation in the racial composition of electoral districts within the city allow us to assess various contextual effects on white voting behavior.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, unlike all but a few other cities, data that reflect voter registration by race and by precinct over a long period of time are available for New Orleans (most states do not require voters to provide their racial identity information). Most precincts in the city have less than 1,000 total registered voters. This relatively small size of precincts allows us to assess contextual effect on white crossover voting at a geographical level approximating a neighborhood.

Along with the demographic changes in New Orleans, there have been important political changes. V. O. Key in his classic study of southern politics described politics in New Orleans as a traditionally white dominant, business-oriented, and strong machine style (1949, p. 159). This is not the case any longer, however. Both whites and blacks have influential political organizations in New Orleans (Hirsch, 1997; Perry, 1997, p. 182). The city elected Ernest "Dutch" Morial as the first black mayor in 1977, and black candidates have won all of the mayoral elections thereafter. The increasing political power of blacks in the city has been reflected in a black majority on the city council since 1986 and on the school board since 1988 (Engstrom and Caridas, 1991, p. 175).

White voters have shown different levels of support for black candidates in New Orleans over the last two decades. Ernest Morial was elected in 1977 when whites were still the majority of registered voters. According to Perry (1997), the upper- and middle-income whites played an important role in Morial's 1977 electoral success. However, he had a "problematic relationship

with the business community,” and he “made whites feel uncomfortable with majority black political leadership in New Orleans.” Overall, the leadership style of Ernest Morial in his eight year mayoral tenure was “confrontational” (Perry, 1997, p. 184).

The second black mayor, Sidney Barthelemy, was more popular than Ernest Morial in New Orleans’ white community (Perry, 1997, pp. 185–197). As the leader of a biracial coalition, Barthelemy received more support from whites than did his white opponents in the 1986 mayoral primary election in which he was perceived to be “less threatening” to white interests than his major opponent William Jefferson, another black candidate (Perry, 1997, p. 197). Some scholars have also argued that Barthelemy employed a deracialization strategy in his campaign (Persons, 1993, p. 53).

White support for black candidates has been far from stable in New Orleans, however. Black candidates have been challenged by whites in many elections. The high level of white support for Sidney Barthelemy in the 1986 mayoral election, for example, dropped dramatically in his 1990 reelection. Racial division was even deeper in the 1994 mayoral election in which a strong white candidate made it to a runoff with Marc Morial, a black candidate and the son of Ernest “Dutch” Morial (Engstrom and Kirkland, 1995, pp. 6–9).

During his first term, Marc Morial, the current mayor of New Orleans, received a white approval rating between 52% to 59% according to two surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of New Orleans (Cooper, 1996, E1; Howell, 1997, p. 1). The hiring of an effective police chief, Richard Pennington, to fight crime was regarded by both whites and blacks before the 1998 election as the highest achievement of Marc Morial (Howell, 1997, p. 6). Partially due to a decline in the crime rate and an improved perception of quality of life, Marc Morial and all of the five black city council members were reelected in the 1998 election (Gill, 1997; E1). Indeed, New Orleans elections provide us with variation in white crossover voting allowing us to discover conditions under which whites are willing to vote for black candidate(s).

The City of New Orleans elects its mayor and city council members once every 4 years. The city council is composed of seven members, two elected at-large and five from single-member districts. The party affiliations of candidates appear on the ballot, but all candidates compete together in a single primary election regardless of their party affiliation. A runoff election must be conducted if no candidate receives the majority of the votes cast (or in the case of the two at-large city council seats candidates need to receive at least 25% of the votes in the primary).

A total of 58 elections for mayor and city council were contested between 1977 and 1998. Thirty-six of these elections presented voters with a choice between or among black and white candidates. Among the 36 biracial elec-

tions, 29 were mayoral and city council district elections. This study focuses on these 29 elections.<sup>2</sup>

## MEASUREMENTS

The major independent variables in this analysis, racial contexts, are measured by the percentage of black registered voters at the precinct and election unit levels. Official voter registration data by race and precinct are available for the whole period under investigation. The racial identity of candidates and newspaper endorsements are derived from the *Times-Picayune*, New Orleans' major newspaper.

The dependent variable of this study, white crossover voting, refers to the extent to which white voters vote for black candidate(s) in a given biracial election. Since voters cast their votes secretly, we cannot know the exact number of crossover votes in a precinct unless that precinct is composed of only white voters. The same is true for an election unit like a district. Previous research has mainly used two methods to measure this phenomenon. One is through surveys in which respondents are asked how they voted in elections (e.g., Carsey, 1995; Reeves, 1997). Studies based on data of this sort have been criticized by many scholars. It has been argued, for example, that survey data are not valid in racially sensitive contexts because many voters may not respond truthfully to survey items (see Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens, 1997; Traugott and Price, 1992). Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to test contextual hypotheses because the individual level data available do not have the necessary variation in the contextual variable or because there is not an adequate number of individuals sampled at the various levels of the contextual variables (Giles, 1996, p. 70).

Another way to measure crossover voting, at least at the election unit level, is through the analysis of aggregate (e.g., precinct level) data. Some research has used the data from racially homogeneous precincts to estimate crossover voting at a higher level (e.g., at a city level; see Herring and Forbes, 1994). Obviously, this research excludes many racially mixed precincts and does not provide an adequate basis for testing contextual effects. In an effort to take all types of precincts into account, one alternative has been to use "double regression." The most serious problem with double regression in contextual research is the assumption that the parameters of interests (e.g., white crossover voting) are constant across the observations (e.g., precincts), whereas they can be different (King, 1997, pp. 58, 66).

Gary King (1997) has recently proposed a new method for estimating behavior such as racial crossover voting through aggregate data that he claims provides more accurate results. Incorporating the deterministic method of bounds with maximum likelihood probabilities, King is able to devise an esti-

mation procedure that not only provides more accurate estimates, according to his verification studies, but also provides standard errors for those estimates (see especially, pp. 199–234). An additional advantage of King’s method for this study, however, is that it can provide estimates of both election unit and precinct level quantities of interest. Our empirical test of King’s method shows that the Ecological Inference procedure is fairly accurate in its white turnout estimates for most New Orleans precincts. Based on our empirical test, this study will use only those precincts in which whites constitute at least 25% of the registered voters (see appendix).

In order to compare the two contexts, an empirical contextual effect model will be employed. This model, described as the “nested contexts” model in previous contextual analyses (Blalock, 1984, pp. 365–366), is based on the characteristic that the neighborhood (precinct) context is *within* the election unit context. Two measures of black density, one operationalized at the election unit level and the other at the precinct level, will be included in the same regression analysis.

**COMPARING THE TWO RACIAL CONTEXTS**

Before the nested contextual model discussed above is tested, a simple bivariate regression between white crossover voting at the precinct level and the black percentage of registered voters within election districts is provided in Equation 1 of Table 1. The dependent variable is the percent of white regis-

**TABLE 1. White Crossover Voting at the Precinct Level and the Black Percentage Registered Voters at the Two Contextual Levels**

	Equation 1 b (st. error)	Equation 2 b (st. error)	Equation 3 b    Beta (st. error)
District black density <sup>a</sup>	1.10*** (.03)		1.07 (.03)    .48***
BPRP <sup>b</sup>		.16*** (.02)	.05 (.01)    .05***
Intercept	-32.60	18.28	-32.47
R <sup>2</sup>	.25	.03	.25
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	.25	.03	.25
N	3787	3787	3787

<sup>a</sup>The black percentage registered voters at the election unit level.

<sup>b</sup>The black percentage registered voters at the precinct level.

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

tered voters crossing over in a precinct. The regression coefficient is a statistically significant 1.10, which indicates that the level of white crossover voting in a precinct is positively related to the black density of the election district to which this precinct belongs. For each percentage point increase in black density at the election unit level there is a 1.1 percentage points increase in the precinct's white crossover voting. The adjusted  $R^2$  for this regression is .25, which is 22 percentage points greater than that for the regression between white crossover voting and the black percentage of registered voters at the precinct level (see Equation 2). The magnitude of the regression coefficient for district black density is also much greater (1.10 compared to .16). Black density at the election unit level is, therefore, a better predictor of white crossover voting than is precinct black density.<sup>3</sup>

To compare the relative effects of district black density and precinct black density in the same analysis, Equation 3 of Table 1 enters both independent variables to the regression (i.e., the nested contextual model). The regression coefficients for district black density and precinct black density are 1.07 and .05, respectively. Both are statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient for district black density is only minimally affected by the simultaneous inclusion of precinct black density (1.10 compared with 1.07), while that for precinct black density drops from .16 to .05. The relative effects of these two independent variables can also be examined through the standardized regression coefficients (betas).<sup>4</sup> The beta for district black density is .48, while the beta for precinct black density is only .05. Therefore, district black density is a much better predictor of white crossover voting than precinct black density, which supports our white strategic voting model.<sup>5</sup> Notice that the adjusted  $R^2$  for Equation 3 is .25, which is 22 percentage points larger than that for the equation containing only precinct black density, but the same as that for Equation 1. This further suggests that it is district black density that is the most explanatory of white crossover voting.<sup>6</sup>

The finding that there is not a negative relationship between black density and white crossover voting may justify a rejection of the black threat hypothesis. However, we need to test further the effect of time before we make this conclusion. As stated above, in the last several decades New Orleans has experienced a racial transition from white dominant to black dominant. Indeed, this "white flight" phenomenon is not uncommon in many American cities (Judd and Swanson, 1998, p. 136). It may suggest that over time more and more white voters might have perceived a higher level of black threat as blacks became more politically powerful through their numeric advantage in the electoral arena (Giles and Buckner, 1996, p.1179). Furthermore, time is also an important factor to be examined because the racial tolerance hypothesis is built upon the positive impact of racial interactions, which certainly "takes time."

**EXAMINING WHITE CROSSOVER VOTING OVER TIME**

In order to test whether the changes in white crossover voting are related to the time of the election, a time variable is added to the analysis. The first year examined (1977) is coded as 1. The next biracial election took place in 1980, so that year is coded as 2. Between 1977 and 1998, there were eight different years that had one or more biracial elections in New Orleans. The maximum value for the time variable is therefore 8.

Equation 1 of Table 2 regresses white crossover voting at the precinct level

**TABLE 2. White Crossover Voting at the Precinct Level and the Black Percentage of Registered Voters at the Two Contextual Levels, Controlling for Time**

	<i>Equation 1</i>		<i>Equation 2</i>		<i>Equation 3</i>		<i>Equation 4</i>	
	b	(st. error)	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
District black density			1.28 (.04)	.58***	2.05 (.10)	.93***	.67 (.04)	.31***
Precinct black density			.05 (.01)	.05***	.06 (.03)	.06	.05 (.01)	.05***
Time	2.25*** (.16)		-1.42 (.18)	-.15***	5.38 (.80)	.55***	-1.06 (.16)	-.11***
Time × district black density					-.14 (.02)	-.96***		
Time × precinct black density					-.001 (.006)	-.01		
Black percentage of candidates							.64 (.02)	.43***
White incumbency <sup>a</sup>							-13.91 (1.05)	-.16***
Election type <sup>b</sup>							-14.47 (.61)	-.30***
Intercept	11.92		-36.08		-71.13		33.21	
R <sup>2</sup>	.05		.26		.28		.46	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.05		.26		.27		.46	
N	3787		3787		3787			

<sup>a</sup>Coded as 1 if there is a white incumbent in the election, 0 otherwise.

<sup>b</sup>Primary = 0, runoff = 1.

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

onto time. The regression coefficient is a statistically significant 2.25. Time seems to be a factor related to white crossover voting. According to this equation, white crossover was 14.17% in 1977, 23.17% in 1986, and 29.92% in 1998. This finding raises a question: Is it possible that the positive relationships between white crossover voting and district black density and precinct black density are just two spurious artifacts of time? Furthermore, is it also reasonable to suggest that white flight likely removes the most hostile whites from the city and leaves those more favorable toward blacks behind? This explanation arguably is consistent with black threat hypothesis and would suggest a positive coefficient with time.<sup>7</sup>

It should be noted that the adjusted  $R^2$  for Equation 1 is only .05, which is 20 percentage points less than the equation containing only district black density (see Equation 1 of Table 1). Thus, time appears to be less predictive of white crossover voting than district black density.

In order to test whether district and precinct black densities are still positively related to white crossover voting, while controlling for the recency of the election, these three variables are included in a single regression equation (Equation 2 of Table 2). The adjusted  $R^2$  is .26, only one percentage point larger than the equation containing only district black density (see Equation 1 of Table 1). Moreover, the regression coefficients are still positive and statistically significant for district black density and precinct black density, with that for district black density increasing to 1.28. The regression coefficient for the time variable, however, while statistically significant, becomes a negative 1.42. This suggests that when district black density and precinct black density are held constant, time is negatively related to white crossover voting. This finding, however, may be due to a multicollinearity problem for there is a very high level of correlation between district black density and the time variable ( $r = .64$ ;  $p < .01$ ).

Despite the multicollinearity problem, district black density is still the strongest predictor of white crossover voting among the three independent variables. The beta is .58 for district black density, that for precinct black density is only .05, and that for the time variable is  $-.15$ . Again, this suggests that district black density is a better variable than precinct black density in explaining white crossover voting.<sup>8</sup>

Equation 2 of Table 2 does not test the interaction between time and the racial contexts. To test further whether or not time may be a conditional factor for the relationship between white crossover voting and racial context, Equation 3 of Table 2 adds two interactive terms. The regression coefficient for the interactive term between time and the precinct level black density is negative and statistically insignificant. The regression coefficient for the other interactive term, between time and district black density, is negative and statistically significant ( $-.14$ ). This indicates that the coefficient estimate for district

black density declines as the value of the time variable increases. In other words, the positive effect of district black density on white crossover voting is reduced over the years under investigation.<sup>9</sup>

One way to interpret Equation 3 of Table 2 is to treat the white voters in different years as different cohorts. In New Orleans' biracial elections the recent cohorts, such as those in the 1994 election, responded to the electoral black density to a less degree than the earlier cohorts, such as those in the 1982 election. This change might be caused by the white flight during the last three decades. The most intolerant white voters might have left the city earlier because of the perceived black threat associated with the black density of election unit. This interpretation, however, may have two problems. First, it is reasonable to use the white flight hypothesis to suggest a positive regression coefficient for the interactive term between black density and time. This is because white flight tends to occur from those districts with a high level of black density, and over time those leftover whites should be more favorable to black candidates than those in more heavily white districts in more recent years. However, according to Equation 3, both interactive terms are negative.

Second, Equation 3 of Table 2 may suggest that over time the white strategic voting for black candidates became less sensitive to black density because there were other factors at work (see below for the effects of other independent variables on white crossover voting). Although our data set does not allow us to fully discover the real reason for the white flight in New Orleans and its effects, Equation 3 of Table 2, at any rate, does not falsify the white strategic voting hypothesis, which expects a positive relationship between white crossover voting and electoral black density. In addition, it should be noticed that the adjusted  $R^2$  for Equation 3 is .274, only about one percentage point larger than that for Equation 2 of Table 2, suggesting that the conditional effect of time on black density was in fact very small. This also strongly suggests that black density is not the only determinant of white crossover voting.

Equation 4 adds three more independent variables (the relative presence of black candidates, white incumbency, and the type of election). The adjusted  $R^2$  for this regression is increased to .46, indicating the effectiveness of adding more independent variables into the previous equation. The time variable is still negative and statistically significant ( $b = -1.06$ ), and both district black density and precinct black density are still positive and statistically significant. The impact of precinct black density remains weak, however, as the regression coefficient is .05. The coefficient for district black density, while smaller than before, is still substantial at .67. The beta is .31 for district black density and only .05 for precinct black density. Again, this indicates that black density at the election unit level is more important in explaining white crossover than it is at the precinct level.

All of the control variables are statistically significant. As expected, the black

percentage of candidates is positively related to white crossover voting, indicating that the more black candidates there are in a biracial election, the greater the possibility that whites can find a favorable black candidate. According to Equation 3, the relationships between white crossover voting and white incumbency and election type are negative. Therefore, the level of white crossover voting declines when there is a white incumbent or when a white candidate successfully enters into the runoff. These findings suggest that white crossover voting is negatively related to white candidate strength, which certainly supports our white strategic voting model.

Moreover, based on the values of the betas for the independent variables, precinct black density has the smallest effect on white crossover voting while the black percentage of candidates is the strongest predictor ( $\beta = .43$ ). The type of election ( $\beta = -.30$ ) is a better predictor than white incumbency ( $\beta = -.16$ ).

#### WHITE CROSSOVER VOTING AND BLACK CANDIDATE'S STRENGTH

Tables 1 and 2 use the overall white crossover in a precinct as the dependent variable, which does not differentiate one black candidate from another. To test whether white crossover voting is also responsive to the characteristics of black candidates (Llorens et al., 1996), two measures of individual black candidate's strength (incumbency and newspaper endorsement) are used, and the dependent variable is changed into individual black candidate's white crossover voting at the precinct level. The results are provided in Table 3.

According to Equation 1 of Table 3, the regression coefficients for both incumbency and endorsement are statistically significant. The model explains 43% of the variance in individual black candidate's white crossover voting at the precinct level. These findings suggest that the strength of black candidates, measured by the incumbency status and newspaper endorsement, does positively influence the level of white crossover voting.

Equation 2 adds the two measures of black density into the regression. The adjusted  $R^2$  is .47, indicating the four variables explain 47% of the variance in the white crossover for individual black candidates. Black incumbency and newspaper endorsement still positively affect the level of white crossover for individual black candidates. As expected, both district and precinct black densities are also positive and statistically significant. The regression coefficient for precinct black density is only .02, while that for district black density is .25. The beta is .19 for district black density and only .04 for precinct black density. This indicates that black density at the election unit level is more important in explaining the white crossover for individual black candidates than it is at the precinct level. Moreover, based on the values of the betas, newspaper endorsement ( $\beta = .64$ ) is the strongest predictor of the white

**TABLE 3. White Crossover Voting and Black Candidate Strength<sup>a</sup>**

	Equation 1	Equation 2	
	b	b	Beta
	(st. error)	(st. error)	
Black incumbency <sup>b</sup>	2.00*** (.41)	1.25 (.39)	.03**
Newspaper endorsement <sup>c</sup>	19.13*** (.33)	19.87 (.32)	.64***
District black density		.25 (.01)	.19***
Precinct black density		.02 (.004)	.04***
Intercept	4.2	-9.35	
R Squared	.43	.47	
Aju. R Squared	.43	.47	
N	9255	9255	

<sup>a</sup>The dependent variable is individual black candidate's white crossover estimate at the precinct level.

<sup>b</sup>Coded as 1 if the black candidate is an incumbent, 0 otherwise.

<sup>c</sup>Coded as 1 if the black candidate is endorsed by the *Times-Picayune*, 0 otherwise.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

crossover for individual black candidates among the four independent variables, while black incumbency status (beta = .03) is less predictive of white crossover than both district black density and precinct black density.

**CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION**

This study has provided a systematic examination of the relative effects of black density at the two geographic levels. The findings reveal that white crossover voting at the precinct level is positively related to black density measured at the election unit level. Although the positive impact of black density at the precinct level also exists, the effect is very weak. Several multiple regressions indicate that the magnitude of the standardized regression coefficient for black density at the election unit level is much larger than that for black density at the precinct level. In other words, the election unit is the context through which black density has its major effect on white crossover voting.

The reason why district black density has a larger effect on white crossover voting than precinct black density is very likely related to the different nature of the two contexts. Whites live in the two racial contexts simultaneously, and

they may perceive them differently. Election district is by nature a political unit, and voting is certainly a form of political behavior. It is in an election unit that political interests and preferences may be in competition. The black density of an election unit reflects the relative power of whites and blacks in that electoral arena. The importance of the racial composition of an election unit is its direct consequence on political outcomes. The greater the black density of the electoral district, the greater the electoral power of blacks and the weaker the electoral power of whites.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to view a neighborhood as a social unit. In a neighborhood whites interact with blacks on both regular and casual bases. The level of black density of a neighborhood reflects the level of racial interactions that whites may have with blacks. But the black density at this small geographic level does not reflect political competition between whites and blacks in elections. Certainly, it would be wrong to argue that the social aspect of racial context, which offers an opportunity for racial interaction, does not have any impact on white voting behavior. However, it is also incorrect to suggest that racial interaction within neighborhoods necessarily limits whites' sensitivity to the broader political context. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) comment, "it is a mistake to believe that more intimately defined environments are more important than environments which are larger and more impersonal" (p. 20). Our examination of New Orleans' white voters suggests that the larger political aspect of racial context matters more than the smaller social aspect of racial context.

To say that the election unit racial context, as a political context, is more important than the neighborhood context, however, still does not explain why black density *positively* influences white crossover voting. While the findings of a positive relationship between black density and white crossover voting is clearly opposite to that predicted by the traditional black threat thesis, a major limitation of social interaction theory is reflected by the finding that the positive effect of black density at the precinct level on white crossover voting is in fact very weak.

Our interpretation of the positive effect of black density at the election unit level on white crossover voting is centered on the assumption that whites see a need to protect their group interests, which is also a proposition of traditional black threat theory. The limitation of traditional black threat theory, however, is that it does not take into account the likelihood of electing a white candidate. More important, the shift in the strategic voting model from the traditional black threat theory is a change in the assumption that whites always use a confrontational political style to protect their group interests.<sup>10</sup>

The foregoing empirical analyses suggest that racial contexts might have played a role in encouraging white voters to make strategic voting decisions. Since a direct consequence of the racial composition of an election unit is that

it may determine the likelihood of electing a white candidate in that unit, the changes in white crossover voting in different racial contexts may indicate a rational and strategic adjustment on the part of white voters when they face the prospect of black electoral success. The goal of this type of strategic voting is to protect white group interests and, at least, not cast a wasted vote. Indeed, voting for the most favorable black candidate who has a good chance to win can at least reduce the chance of electing an unfavorable black candidate.

By itself, black density is not the only factor that stimulates white strategic crossover. Our multiple regression shows that it is also important to take other factors into account. The relative presence of black candidates reflects black involvement in a biracial election. The more black candidates there are in a biracial election, the greater the possibility that whites can find a favorable black candidate. Our findings also suggest that the level of white crossover is negatively related to the strength of white candidates. The presence of a white incumbent in a biracial election may reduce the level of white crossover voting. Whites also show a lower level of support for black candidates in the biracial runoff elections than in the biracial primaries. The levels of white crossover, in short, may be affected by whites' recognition of the probability of white electoral success.

Our empirical evidence also suggests that whites do have two cues to aid in the choice of a black candidate: black incumbency status and the endorsement of a "white" newspaper. Comparatively speaking, the newspaper endorsement plays a much more important role than black incumbency status. The stronger effect of newspaper endorsement than black incumbency may be due to the newspaper endorsement being a clearer form of white "validation" of black candidates. Black incumbents, on the other hand, still need to persuade white voters that they are racially friendly.

#### APPENDIX: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF KING'S NEW METHOD OF ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE

Several scholars have used Louisiana election data to test King's method of ecological inference and suggested that his method can provide more accurate aggregate-based estimates for individual behavior than previously available statistical procedures (Palmquist, 1999; Palmquist and Voss, 1997; Voss and Lublin, 1998). Given the secrecy of the ballot, it is not possible to test the accuracy of estimates of crossover voting based on King's methodology. But it is possible to test the accuracy of estimates of another form of behavior using that method. Voter sign-in counts by race and precinct are available by race and precinct for municipal elections in New Orleans beginning in 1990. Therefore, estimates of voter turnout, by race, derived through King's method can be compared to the actual counts to test how closely the estimates match the true values.

To get the estimates of white turnout rates at the precinct level using King's statisti-

cal software, three variables at the precinct level are employed: total number of registered voters in each precinct, the proportion of registered voters that is black in each precinct, and the proportion of registered voters who signed in to vote in each precinct. With these data, the first step of King's procedure produces estimates of the proportions of white and black registered voters that turned out (or signed in) to vote at both the election unit level and the precinct level. The second step (i.e., E12), which needs an additional variable (the proportion of votes received by black candidate[s] in each precinct), will produce estimates of the proportions of white and black voters that voted for black candidates at the two geographic levels.

Figure A1 depicts the comparison between King's estimates of precinct level turnout rates for whites in the 1990 mayoral primary election and the *true* values based on the actual sign-in data. The actual white turnout rates are plotted along the vertical axis of the figures, and the corresponding estimates derived through King's method are plotted along the horizontal axis. The diagonal across the bottom left and upper right represents perfect correspondence between these values. As shown in the figures, the heavy dark areas along this diagonal indicate that King's method successfully predicts the white turnout for most precincts.

In Figure A1, there are some precincts far from the diagonal, which indicates obvious errors of estimates. A further examination of these precincts, however, shows a pattern of error distribution: these precincts are more likely to be the precincts that had a very large percentage of black registered voters. The existence of the pattern of error distribution is intrinsically related to King's method of ecological inference. King's method employs the deterministic method of bounds in the computation of the quantities of interest. For any given precinct, a bound determines a range within which a point estimate must fall. Based on King's method (1997, pp. 79, 85–90), the 1990 New Orleans' mayoral primary election has the following characteristics: all precincts with less than 25% black registered voters had a narrow bound, therefore a small uncertainty, for white turnout estimates and a wide bound, therefore a large uncertainty, for black turnout estimates. The precincts that had more than 75% black registered voters had exactly an opposite characteristic of bounds, namely, a narrow bound for black turnout estimates and a wide bound for white turnout estimates.

Due to the high level of uncertainty associated with the wide bounds for some precincts, King's method, which also employs techniques of maximum likelihood probabilities to compute quantities of interest, may produce a high level of error for these precincts. This is especially likely to occur in precincts with an overwhelming majority of the registered voters from one racial group. In these precincts the turnout rate of the other group of voters does not significantly influence the magnitude of overall level of turnout.

One way to reduce the negative effect of estimation errors in our study of white crossover voting in New Orleans is to exclude the overwhelmingly black precincts. In fact, some of the precincts in New Orleans have had no white registered voters at all. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for the 270 precincts with no more than 75% black registered voters at the time of the 1990 mayoral primary. The mean error in estimation is 2.9 percentage points, the standard deviation is 3.6, and the range is from .01 to 21.7. King's method provides estimates within 1 percentage point of the actual



**TABLE A1. Descriptive Statistics for King's Errors in Estimating White Turnout for Precincts with Equal or Less Than 75% Black Voters Registration<sup>a</sup>**

Absolute Error <sup>b</sup>	Number of Precincts	(%)
<1	114	(42.2)
1 to <2	42	(15.6)
2 to <5	62	(22.9)
5 to <10	37	(13.7)
10 to <15	12	(4.5)
15 to <20	2	(0.7)
≥20	1	(0.4)
Total:	270	(100)

<sup>a</sup>The registration data are provided by the Registrar of Voters for the Parish of Orleans, and the voter sign-in data are provided by the Louisiana Department of Elections.

<sup>b</sup>The absolute error = |true precinct turnout – King's estimate of precinct turnout|.

standard. Table A2 provides the descriptive statistics for white crossover voting in the different precincts between 1977 and 1998.

Another important feature of King's EI procedure is that it allows researchers to model aggregation bias (i.e., the parameters are correlated with the regressors) that violates the basic assumption of King's basic model through the use of covariate(s) in extended models (King, 1997, pp. 158–196). To discover possible aggregation bias, EI provides useful graphic diagnostics (King, 1997, pp. 158–196, 282–291). While the results reported in this article were based on the EI's basic model, all estimates of

**TABLE A2. Descriptive Statistics for White Crossover Voting in the Different Precincts, 1977–1998**

BPRP <sup>a</sup>	N of Precincts (%)		Mean White Crossover	St. Dev.	(Range)
=0	231	(6.1)	12.28	13.85	(0, 60.00)
>0 and ≤10	1190	(31.4)	17.95	19.61	(0, 99.00)
>10 and ≤20	533	(14.1)	22.60	22.08	(0, 98.29)
>20 and ≤30	353	(9.3)	23.43	23.61	(0.45, 99.69)
>30 and ≤40	325	(8.6)	24.80	23.31	(0.44, 100)
>40 and ≤50	295	(7.8)	22.73	21.28	(0.32, 98.65)
>50 and ≤60	352	(9.3)	25.53	23.10	(0.39, 100)
>60 and ≤70	321	(8.5)	28.59	23.35	(0.37, 100)
>70 and ≤75	187	(4.9)	29.20	25.28	(0.43, 95.98)
Overall	3787	(100)	22.04	22.08	(0, 100)

<sup>a</sup>The black percentage of registered voters in the precinct.

precinct level white crossover in the 29 elections under this investigation were checked for possible aggregation bias. Using the extended models, however, did not change the interpretation of the findings presented in this article. Furthermore, no EI estimates of white crossover voting in New Orleans' elections are found inconsistent with the available qualitative information. For example, the white crossover voting rates for popular black candidates, such as Mayor Sidney Barthelemy, city councilmen James Singleton and Troy Carter, are estimated much higher than those for the black candidates, such as Ernest Morial, who were seen as hostile to white interests. It is impossible to document all 81 black candidates' white crossover estimates in the 29 elections. The estimates are available from the author.

## NOTES

1. In New Orleans, District A (officially assigned name) has been a white dominant election unit for a long time. The mean percentage of black registered voters in the three biracial elections between 1980 and 1994 was 28.7. District B has been a predominantly black district, in which the mean percentage of black registered voters in the three biracial elections between 1982 and 1994 was 64.7. District C has experienced a racial transition, with the percentage of black registered voters increasing from 31.9 at the time of 1977 biracial election in that district, to 50.8 in the biracial election in 1994. Districts D and E have both completed the transition from racially competitive to black dominant contexts, with the percentage of black registered voters exceeding 55 in the 1990s.
2. The other seven biracial elections were council at-large elections. They will not be included in the following empirical analyses because they provided voters with two votes, and it is impossible to accurately estimate white crossover voting in these at-large elections (see appendix for the discussion of the statistical procedure adopted in this article).
3. No curvilinear relationships were found for the models reported in Table 1.
4. Although the values of betas are not a perfect way to test the importance of a variable (Achen, 1982), political scientists have indicated that "they are convenient for making comparisons across variables" (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995, p. 292). Thus, this study uses both unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients to compare different variables in the same models.
5. This article uses the data set that combines biracial mayoral and city council elections. This data set provides the necessary variations in some of the independent variables. (Using the biracial mayoral elections only, for example, would not give us any variation in the white candidate status variable because none of the nine mayoral elections had any white incumbent.) While the city as a whole and council districts are both local election units, one may object to our findings because our models throw all of the mayoral and city council elections into the same data set, which may cause spatial autocorrelation problems. If many of the same white voters voted repeatedly in both the mayoral and council district elections, then their crossover rates might be related across elections, which reinforces the observed patterns. One way to test this possibility is to break up the data and analyze the mayoral elections alone and see whether white crossover voting in the mayoral elections is still influenced by the black density of the voter's council districts. The result of this analysis (not shown) indicates that in the mayoral elections the level of white crossover was related only to the black density of *the city*, not to the black density of *council district*. This finding supports our explanations of the statistical results. Furthermore, all the models of Table 1 were also tested

by separating mayoral from city council elections. The results (not shown) were very similar to those reported in the article, which further confirms our conclusion.

6. It is worth noting that all of the results reported here were based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. The same equations in these tables were also tested by the additional weighted least squares (WLS) analyses, in which the inverse of the standard error of white crossover estimate was used as a weighting variable in order to take the standard errors of King's white crossover estimates into account (Burden and Kimball, 1998). In addition, to take into account that the precincts examined in this article had different numbers of white voters, the number of white candidates in the precincts therefore was also used as a weighting variable. The results based on these WLS analyses are substantially similar to those reported in the tables, which further confirms the findings presented in this article.
7. For example, if there were a thousand voters in a district, and 600 of these voters were white, then 300 white voters crossing over would constitute a 50% (i.e., 300/600) white crossover rate. If over time 200 racially intolerant white voters fled to other areas, then the same 300 white voters crossing over would produce a 75% (i.e., 300/400) white crossover rate.
8. To be sure, Equation 2 of Table 2 does indicate a serious problem for the racial tolerance hypothesis. This is not just because the regression coefficient for the precinct level black density is small (.05); the negative effect of time found in this equation is at odds with the racial tolerance hypothesis, which would expect time as a positive predictor of white crossover voting in New Orleans given the increasing opportunities for racial interactions in the city over the last two decades. With respect to the black threat hypothesis, it is expected white crossover voting is negatively related to black density. The regression coefficients for the two black density measures in Equation 2 of Table 2, however, are still statistically significant and positive, with that for the electoral black density increasing to 1.28. This is certainly contrary to the expectation of the black threat hypothesis.
9. Based on Equation 3 of Table 2, the effect of electoral black density on white crossover voting remains positive and statistically significant between 1977 and 1998, although it is reduced over time. For 1977, the regression coefficient is 1.91 (that is  $2.05 - (1 \cdot .14)$ ). For 1998, the regression coefficient is .93 (i.e.,  $2.05 - (8 \cdot .14)$ ).
10. A recent study also reports that racially motivated antiminority crimes are less likely to occur in integrated areas than in the white predominant areas in New York City (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong, 1998). One reason, according to the authors, is that integration "gradually undermines the extent to which whites regard a given area as their territory" (p. 397). This finding and its explanation are certainly in line with our research. White voters do not always use confrontation to protect their interests, especially as they face increasing presence of minority in their areas.

## REFERENCES

- Achen, Christopher H. (1982). *Interpretation and Analysis of Regression*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Arden, W., Grofman, B., and Handley, L. (1997). The impact of redistricting on African-American representation in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures in the 1990s. *National Political Science Review* 6: 35-43.
- Blalock, H. (1984). Contextual-effects models: theoretical and methodological Issues. *Annual Review of Sociology* 10: 353-372.
- Brady, Henry E., Verba, Sidney, and Schlozman, Kay Lehman (1995). Beyond SES: a resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review* 89: 271-294.

- Bullock, Charles S. (1985). Aftermath of the Voting Rights Act: racial voting patterns in Atlanta-area elections. In Lorn S. Foster (ed.), *The Voting Rights Act: Consequences and Implications*, pp. 185–208. New York: Praeger.
- Burden, Barry C., and Kimball, David C. (1998). A new approach to the study of ticket splitting. *American Political Science Review* 92: 533–544.
- Carsey, Thomas M. (1995). The contextual effects of race on white voter behavior: the 1989 New York City mayoral election. *The Journal of Politics* 57: 221–228.
- Cooper, Christopher (1996). Orleans proud to call it home. *Times Picayune*, E1, November 18.
- DeLorenzo, Lisa C., Kohfeld, Carol W., and Stein, Lana (1997). The impact of cross-racial voting on St. Louis primary election results. *Urban Affairs Review* 33: 120–133.
- DiPrete, Thomas A., and Forristal, Jerry D. (1994). Multilevel models: methods and substance. *Annual Review of Sociology* 20: 331–357.
- Engstrom, Richard L., and Caridas, Victoria M. (1991). Voting for judge: race and rolloff in judicial elections. In William Crotty (ed.), *Political Participation and Democratic Politics*, pp. 171–191. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Engstrom, Richard L., and Willie D. Kirkland (1995). The 1994 New Orleans mayoral elections: racial divisions continue. *Urban News* 9: 6–9.
- Giles, Micheal W. (1996). A comment on “David Duke and Black Threat.” *The American Review of Politics* 17: 69–72.
- Giles, Micheal W., and Buckner, Melanie A. (1996). Comment. *Journal of Politics* 58: 1171–1180.
- Giles, Micheal W., and Buckner, Melanie A. (1993). David Duke and black threat: an old hypothesis revisited. *Journal of Politics* 55: 702–713.
- Giles, Micheal W., and Hertz, Kaenan (1994). Racial threat and partisan identification. *American Political Science Review* 88: 317–326.
- Gill, J. (1997). New polls a plus for morial and friends. *Times Picayune* E1, November 19.
- Glaser, James M. (1994). Back to the black belt: racial environment and white racial attitudes in the south. *Journal of Politics* 56: 21–41.
- Green, Donald P., Strolovitch, Dara Z., and Wong, Janelle S. (1998). Defended neighborhoods, integration, and racially motivated crime. *American Journal of Sociology* 104: 372–403.
- Herring, Mary, and Forbes, John (1994). The overrepresentation of a white minority: Detroit’s at-large city council, 1961–1989. *Social Science Quarterly* 75: 431–445.
- Hirsch, Arnold R. (1997). Harold and Dutch: a comparative look at the first black mayors of Chicago and New Orleans. In Raymond A. Mohl (ed.), *The Making of Urban America*, 2nd ed. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., pp. 265–282.
- Howell, Susan E. (1997). A citizen evaluation of the Morial administration: 1994–1997. Press Release, UNO Survey Research Center, November 1997.
- Huckfeldt, Robert (1986). *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods*. New York: Agathon Press.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, and Sprague, John (1995). *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Judd, Dennis R., and Swanstrom, Todd (1998). *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy*. New York: Longman.
- Key, V. O. (1949). *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Mendelberg, Tali (1995). Cracks in American apartheid: the political impact of prejudice among desegregated whites. *Journal of Politics* 57: 402–424.

- King, Gary (1997). *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstruction Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kuklinski, James H., Cobb, Michael D., and Gilens, Martin (1997). Racial attitudes and the "new south." *Journal of Politics* 59: 323–349.
- Lieske, Joel (1989). The political dynamics of urban voting behavior. *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 150–174.
- Liu, Baodong (2001). The positive effect of black density on white crossover voting: reconsidering social interaction theory. *Social Science Quarterly*, 82: 602–615.
- Liu, Baodong, and Vanderleeuw, James M. (1999). White-voter response to black political power: the case of New Orleans, 1980–1994. *Southeastern Political Review* 27: 175–188.
- Llorens, James L., Parsons, Sharon K., and Perry, Huey L. (1996). The election of Troy Carter to the Louisiana House of Representatives. In Huey L. Perry (ed.), *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*, pp. 107–123. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- McClain, Paula D., and Garcia, John A. (1993). Expanding disciplinary boundaries: black, Latino, and racial minority group politics in political science. In Ada W. Finifter (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*, pp. 247–279. Washington DC: American Political Science Association.
- Palmquist, Bradley (1999). Ecological inference in practice. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Palmquist, Bradley, and Voss, D. Stephens (1997). Racial polarization and turnout in Louisiana: new insights from aggregate data analysis. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Perry, Huey L. (1996). *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Perry, Huey L. (1997). The evolution and impact of biracial coalition and black mayors in Birmingham and New Orleans. In Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb (eds.), *Racial Politics in American Cities*, pp. 179–200. New York: Longman.
- Persons, Georgia A. (ed.). (1993). *Dilemmas of Black Politics: Issues of Leadership and Strategy*. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
- Reeves, Keith (1997). *Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates and Racial Politics in America*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sadow, Jeffrey D. (1996). David Duke and black threat: laying to rest an old hypothesis, revisited. *The American Review of Politics* 17: 59–68.
- Sonenshein, Raphael J. (1997). The prospects for multiracial coalitions: lessons from America's three largest cities. In Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb (eds.), *Racial Politics in American Cities*. New York: Longman, pp. 41–65.
- Traugott, M. W., and Price, V. (1992). Exit polls in the 1989 Virginia gubernatorial race: where did they go wrong? *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56: 245–253.
- Vanderleeuw, James M. (1990). A city in transition: the impact of changing racial composition on voting behavior. *Social Science Quarterly* 71: 326–328.
- Voss, D. Stephen (1996). Beyond racial threat: failure of an old hypothesis in the new south. *Journal of Politics* 58: 1156–1170.
- Voss, D. Stephen, and Lublin, David (2001). Black candidates, white districts: an appraisal of the 1996 congressional elections. *American Politics Quarterly* 29: 141–182.
- Voss, D. Stephen, and Lublin, David (1998). Ecological inference and the comparative method. *APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics* 9: 25–31.