Laurence Carlin
Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
Abstracts of Recent
Papers
(Papers available upon request,
and all feedback is welcome.)
"Selecting a Phenomenalism: Leibniz, Berkeley, and the Science of Happiness," Journal of the History of Ideas (forthcoming).
Abstract: While it is well known that Leibniz and Berkeley adopted versions of phenomenalism and rejected the widespread materialist view that nature consisted of mind-independent extended objects, it seems less well known that both thinkers also believed that knowledge of nature, via the mechanical philosophy, is a necessary condition for human happiness. Yet an examination of their respective accounts of happiness reveals weighty differences, and these differences are rooted in their respective phenomenalisms. The upshot is the somewhat surprising conclusion that adhering to a certain type of phenomenalism can place restrictions on one’s account of human happiness, for Berkeley could not, by the very logic of his phenomenalism, embrace Leibniz’s views on human happiness, nor could Leibniz embrace Berkeley’s. This is significant not only for understanding the systems of Leibniz and Berkeley, but it also illuminates any view that grounds the science of happiness in knowledge of a “material” world that is in some sense mind-dependent.
“Leibniz and Berkeley on Teleological Intelligibility,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (2), 2006, 151-169.
Abstract: The contention of this paper is that although both Berkeley and Leibniz were teleologists, their respective teleological accounts were required to perform substantially different tasks, and this is due to their differing conceptions of phenomena. The upshot is that adhering to a certain conception of phenomena can place restrictions on one’s account of intelligible explanations of the natural world. This same philosophical upshot, it will be argued, is at play in contemporary debates in the philosophy of science, and this perspective from contemporary debates serves to bolster the claim that Leibniz and Berkeley were not close philosophical companions, contrary to what recent commentators have maintained.
"Leibniz on Final Causes," Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2), 2006, 217-233.
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate Leibniz’s conception of final causation. I focus especially on the role that Leibnizian final causes play in intentional action, and I argue that for Leibniz, final causes are a species of efficient causation. It is the intentional nature of final causation that distinguishes it from mechanical efficient causation. I conclude by highlighting some of the implications of Leibniz’s conception of final causation for his views on human freedom, and on the unconscious activity of substances.
"Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4), 2004, 365–379.
Abstract: In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz’s concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics––his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz’s system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the "well-founding" of those bodies in simple substances.
"Can Any Divine Punishment
Be Morally Justified?," Philo 6 (2), 2003, 280-298.
Abstract: A traditional and widespread belief among theists is that God administers punishment for sins and/or immoral actions. In this paper, I argue that there is good reason to believe that the infliction of any suffering on humans by God (i.e. a perfectly just being) is morally unjustified. This conclusion is important not only because it conflicts with a deeply entrenched religious belief, but also because, as I show, a number of recent argumentative strategies employed by theistic philosophers require that divine punishment be morally justifiable. I also conclude, then, that the arguments put forth by these theistic philosophers do not succeed.
"Reward and Punishment
in the Best Possible World: Leibniz's Theory of Natural Retribution," The
Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (2), 2002, 139-160.
Abstract: This paper examines Leibniz's theory of natural punishment and reward. That is, it examines Leibniz's claim that the harmony of nature and grace ensures that every vicious act is punished by the ways of mechanical nature and every virtuous act is rewarded by the ways of mechanical nature.
"Leibniz’s Great Chain
of Being," Studia Leibnitiana 32(2), 2000, 131-150.
Abstract: One application of Leibniz's "law of continuity" yields the thesis that the totality of created substances form a hierarchy with respect to degrees of perfection. Commentators have objected that this application is inconsistent with Leibniz's claim that rational substances are a separate class of created being altogether. I argue that Leibniz’s metaphysics meets both demands: on the one hand, the demand that all beings may be located on a single scale of a continuous ordering of perfection, and on the other, that rational beings are a separate class of created being altogether.
"On the Very Concept of Harmony
in Leibniz," The Review of Metaphysics 54(1), 2000, 99-125.
Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to elucidate Leibniz’s notion of harmony through an examination of the relevant texts. I present and discuss Leibniz’s favorite characterization of harmony, and argue that harmony is not merely an ontological notion, but that it also calls for analysis from an epistemological point of view. Specifically, it calls for analysis from the point of view of Leibniz’s theory of relations, and his doctrine of distinct vs. confused cognition. Thus, I present and discuss some texts that explicitly link these features of his thought with the notion of harmony. Throughout, I attempt to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for a collection of entities to be in a state of harmony.
"Infinite Accumulations and Pantheistic
Implications: Leibniz and the Anima Mundi," The Leibniz
Review 7, December 1997, 1-24.
Abstract: Throughout his early writings, Leibniz was concerned with developing an acceptable account of God's relationship to the created world. In some of these early writings, he endorsed the idea that this relationship was similar to the human soul's relationship to the body. Though he eventually came to reject this idea, the anima mundi thesis remained the topic of several essays and correspondences during his career, culminating in the correspondence with Clarke. I examine these discussions chronologically, from the De Summa Rerum (1675-6), to the correspondence with Clarke (1715-6).
"Leibniz's Philosophy
of Mind" (with Mark Kulstad), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Abstract: On-line encyclopedia entry at Stanford, detailing Leibniz's views in the philosophy of mind. (Click on title to visit the article.)
"Ascriptive Supervenience,"
Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1), 1997, 47-57.
Abstract: I distinguish between two kinds of supervenience, ontological and ascriptive. I examine the concept of ascriptive supervenience.